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OUTPOST YEARS FOR A START-UP AGENCY:
THE FTC FROM 1921–1925
MARC WINERMAN
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC*
This study examines the Federal Trade Commission during the Presi-
dential term that began in March 1921,1 which Warren G. Harding
started and Calvin Coolidge finished after Harding died. In its first six
years, the Commission had already been shaken by high turnover at the
Commission level and by American participation in the First World
War—participation which produced a virtual suspension of antitrust, a
diversion of the agency from its contemplated tasks, and dramatic
swings in staff size. Now it confronted, as well, its first change in Presi-
dential leadership.
We see the distant events of this era as having considerable signifi-
cance for current policymaking, especially for the design and operation
of new competition policy systems. In this article, we focus on events in
the latter part of the agency’s first decade, with brief summaries of its
earlier years. This was a period in which the agency faced tremendous
challenges in building a relatively novel institutional framework and ap-
plying the agency’s new powers to address specific commercial phenom-
ena. Today the number of jurisdictions with competition systems
exceeds 110, and over half of these systems have been formed since
* William Kovacic is a Commissioner with the Federal Trade Commission and a Profes-
sor of Law at the George Washington Law School (on leave). Marc Winerman is an Attor-
ney Adviser to Commissioner Kovacic; portions of his research were undertaken when he
was the Victor H. Kramer Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the authors alone. The authors are grateful for comments and
suggestions from Alden Abbott, James Cooper, James May, Paul Pautler, Elizabeth
Schneirov, and Andrew Winerman; for archival assistance from Tab Lewis of the National
Archives and Records Administration; and for research assistance from Kolin Tang and
Reshaun Finkley.
1 Until 1937, the Presidential transition took place on March 4. “I Do Solemnly Swear
. . . ,” Presidential Inaugurations, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/pihtml/pimenu.html.
The date was moved to January 20 by Constitutional Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XX § 1.
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1980. In the past five years alone, there have been major additions to the
roster of new systems (e.g., China and Egypt) and the substantial refor-
mulation of older competition regimes (e.g., India and Pakistan). These
and many other nations now face many of the same institutional chal-
lenges that confronted the FTC in the Commission’s first decade.
Reflecting on the FTC’s experience and those of other authorities
suggests that there is an identifiable life cycle that characterizes the de-
velopment of a competition agency. In the early phase of this lifecycle,
competition agencies encounter many of the same fundamental ques-
tions about how to design a new system of law and create institutions to
apply the law effectively. In its first decade, the FTC struggled to set
priorities, to establish an effective internal structure and operating pro-
cedures, to gain acceptance for its judgments before reviewing courts,
the public, and Congress, and to define how it would exercise a broad,
elastic mandate amid a multiplicity of expectations about what it should
seek to accomplish. These are precisely the issues that face new agencies
today in the early phase of their existence, but, unlike later national
agencies with broad competition (and sometimes consumer protection)
mandates, the FTC confronted them without prior national templates to
which it could look.2
The Commission’s experience in its first decade sheds light on how
an agency might go about facing problems that we now know to be pre-
dictable features of a competition agency’s first years. Several lessons
from the decade ring true today. For example, a major determinant of
an agency’s success is its ability to sustain a good fit between its program
commitments and its capacity to execute the programs skillfully. An
agency also must pay close attention to how decisionmaking authority is
assigned. The FTC unwisely adopted the custom of rotating the chair-
manship annually among its five Commissioners. This arrangement
came at a high cost in operational effectiveness, for it prevented a single
Chair from engaging in the longer-term planning and prioritizing that
an agency needs to prosper. Early efforts to sustain the FTC’s decisions
before the federal courts suffered from a tendency to issue opinions
consisting of little more than some description of facts and a cryptic
statement of the rationale for the outcome. The FTC’s early experiences
thus suggest how new agencies can improve their effectiveness.
2 The FTC would itself provide a template for other national agencies, including those
that combined broad sectoral reach with both competition and consumer protection
work. The FTC was preceded as a national regulatory Commission by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, but that agency was engaged in sector-specific public utility regula-
tion that raised far different issues than did the FTC’s broad regulatory authority.
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In the context of a longer-term project to explore the FTC’s history,
we also touch in this study on three related questions.
First, how did the Commission function during these years? How was
it organized, what were its internal fault lines, and where were its ten-
sions and alliances with external stakeholders and collateral public insti-
tutions, such as the Departments of Commerce and Justice?
The answers turn in part on the fate in the 1920s of the Progressive
movement that spawned the FTC. Though the crusading progressivism
of the 1910s was in retreat, the Commission remained an outpost for
both collective and individual actions by Wilson-appointed Progressives
of differing stripes. Most discussions of the FTC in the 1920s focus on
William Humphrey, a controversial ex-Congressman who drew head-
lines with his arrival in 1925, his removal by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933,
and his posthumous vindication when the Supreme Court held, in 1935,
that his removal had been unlawful.3 Although Humphrey’s arrival
would play a galvanizing role, the FTC was no stranger to political dis-
putes before he came; Huston Thompson, a Wilson holdover, was in
some ways his mirror image.
Further, progressivism was neither dead nor dormant in the 1920s.
Elements survived in both parties’ Congressional delegations and in the
Administration, providing institutional allies for Commissioners. In the
cabinet, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover pursued a variety of
“associational” progressivism, whose adherents included Louis Brandeis
and FTC Commissioner Nelson Gaskill. The Commission also found oc-
casional allies in the Justice Department, particularly, on at least some
issues, under Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone (1924–25).
The answers also depend on the early Commission’s skill in maneu-
vering through an existing structure of public institutions that, by law or
by their own initiative, exercised policymaking functions that over-
lapped directly with the FTC’s charter or strongly affected its programs.
For example, in 1914 Congress gave both the FTC and the Justice De-
partment power to enforce the Clayton Act without specifying a mecha-
nism for allocating tasks between them. With its array of authorities, the
FTC Act created the possibility (soon to become a reality) that the Com-
mission would be evaluating and commenting upon the adequacy of the
Department’s work, and, in at least some cases, sharing enforcement
responsibility with the Department. By all of these measures, Congress
3 See, e.g., ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE GREAT WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN ORDER 85
(2d ed.1992) [hereinafter GREAT WAR]; Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935).
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made the agency a rival to the Department, a development that top DOJ
leadership did not welcome in 1914 and would disapprove in the years
to come. The wisdom of the experiment with a decentralization of anti-
trust policymaking between two federal institutions would depend on
how rivalry and cooperation between these bodies unfolded. The expe-
rience of the FTC’s first decade revealed tensions that persist to this day.
Second, a related question explores conceptual frameworks that
drove or divided the agency. What were the interweaving ideas that, in
many cases, transcended party lines? Various visions that competed
within the Commission during these years all had earlier roots. Some
traced back to, among other visions, Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom”;
Theodore Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism”; and the associationalism of
Brandeis and others.4
Third, how well did the FTC accomplish the tasks that it set for itself,
or that others set for it? Past studies have tended to denigrate its per-
formance broadly and accuse the agency, among other faults, with hav-
ing a preoccupation with insignificant matters; later characterizations of
those studies have tended to magnify negative assessments.5 Our view of
the early FTC experience is more favorable. Most notably, we find that
the FTC had an ambitious agenda. It tackled issues in movies and radio,
the “new economy” industries of the day. It addressed competitive con-
ditions in prospering industries that had been subjects of past antitrust
cases, including oil, tobacco, aluminum, and steel. It studied industries
like the coal and agriculture sectors that did not share in the general
prosperity. It opposed efforts to stifle what it saw to be new and promis-
ing modes of distribution. The agency challenged basing point pricing,
starting a saga that would extend for decades, and that, at the outset,
pitted Pittsburgh and the East against other regions. It challenged major
oil companies, U.S. Steel, RCA, Eastman Kodak, and the National Bis-
cuit Company.
The FTC also developed what today is called its consumer protection
authority. The establishment of a substantial consumer protection func-
tion was largely unanticipated in the 1914 debates. The FTC’s develop-
ment of a distinctive, national consumer protection program was a
major innovation with great commercial and legal significance because
4 See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY, INTRODUCTION
(2d. ed. 1995) [hereinafter NEW DEAL]; HAWLEY, GREAT WAR, supra note 3, at 9.
5 See, e.g., Report of the ABA Commission to Study the FTC 9–11 (1969). Robert Him-
melberg asserts that the agency “very rarely” challenged big firms during these years. ROB-
ERT HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 49 (1976). See
generally William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Anti-
trust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 600 (1982) [hereinafter Oversight].
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competitors were the most likely to be in a position to challenge mis-
leading advertising, and, at common law, there was no remedy available
to competitors for most forms of consumer deception.6
Nearly a century of experience has shown that the Commission func-
tions best when it uses the range of policy instruments available to it and
when it integrates its economic and legal functions.7 In the early 1920s
the agency was quite successful on the first score. It combined statutory
functions of investigating, reporting, litigating, and referring cases to
the DOJ (usually for criminal or contempt proceedings) with a “trade
practice submittal” procedure, independent of a statutory warrant, that
solicited public input for policymaking. Measured by the second crite-
rion of interdisciplinary policymaking integration, however, its record
was mixed.
Ultimately, though, some of its substantive efforts were misguided and
many foundered. Though the FTC faced statutory impediments and a
hostile judiciary, key elements of its work were flawed. A comparison of
its adjudicative decisions to its briefs defending those decisions on judi-
cial review, for example, highlights instances where it failed to put its
best foot forward or adequately explain what its cases sought to achieve.
At the root of some of these self-inflicted wounds is the fact that it simply
tried to do too much with a staff of less than 320 and some 35 litigators.8
A core problem, the product of both internal misjudgments and exoge-
nous factors, was its failure to set priorities and match commitments to
capabilities.
I. PRELUDE
New public institutions are shaped by an intellectual and political
context that encompasses both the technical authority granted to an
agency in its enabling legislation and expectations about how the au-
thority will be exercised. In many instances, the surrounding context is
complex, for it presents an amalgam of sometimes consistent, some-
times complementary, and sometimes conflicting views about what the
agency should do. The amalgam is embedded in the legislation through
compromises that seldom directly reconcile competing points of view
6 Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 192–96, 251 (1936).
7 For further development of these themes, see WILLIAM KOVACIC, FTC CHAIRMAN, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 141–42 (2009) [hereinafter
FTC AT 100], available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf.
8 FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1924, at 5, 14 (numbers) [hereinafter 1924 ANNUAL REPORT];
FTC Staff and Budget Information, 1915–2000, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
Antitrust_Resources/FTC_Staff_and_Budget_Information.ashx.
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and instead depend heavily on open-ended commands that enable com-
peting interests and factions to see an acceptable image of what the
agency might come to be.
One of the most daunting tasks for new leadership at a new competi-
tion agency is to accurately identify the multiple policy impulses that
brought the agency to life, to assess the relative intensity and impor-
tance of individual ideas, and to formulate a program that is coherent;
that remains, in some convincing way, faithful to the aims that animated
the agency’s formation, and that adapts to some degree as the intellec-
tual and political environment around it changes. As we review below,
the intellectual and political context that surrounded the adoption of
the FTC Act in 1914 featured multiple visions for the new agency, and
the challenge to the FTC’s early leadership to reconcile them was
formidable.
A. MULTIPLE VISIONS AT THE ORIGIN
The Progressive Era was a time of broad reform, some but not all of
which anticipated modern liberalism.9 Certain historians have sought
coherence in progressivism by focusing on specific groups or themes;
others deny that there was a “movement” at all.10 Daniel Rodgers identi-
fies three distinct and sometimes contradictory languages or clusters of
ideas that different Progressives embraced: “Antimonopolism” (the most
distinctly American); an “emphasis on social bonds and the social na-
ture of human beings”; and a “language of social efficiency.”11
Various strands of progressivism entered into the debate about trust
policy. The Sherman Act was already two decades old when the Su-
preme Court ordered the breakup of Standard Oil and announced the
rule of reason.12 Trust policy was a major issue in the 1912 election, lead-
ing into the legislative debates that produced the FTC and Clayton Acts
9 Thus, Constitutional amendments of the era addressed taxing authority, direct elec-
tion of Senators, prohibition, and women’s suffrage. At least some Progressives addressed
trust policy, food and drug safety, jurisprudential reform, protective labor legislation, and
conservation. See, e.g., Peter G. Filene, An Obituary for the “Progressive Movement,” 22 AM. Q.
20 (1970); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113 (1982);
JAMES H. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1900–1920 (1963).
10 See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 137–38 (1955) (focusing on
“civic leaders of a former era” who felt threatened); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF
CONSERVATIVISM (1963) (honing in on the very people who threatened Hofstadter’s lead-
ers of a former era); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1967);
MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVE-
MENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003). Filene, supra note 9 (denying there was a
movement).
11 Rodgers, supra note 9, at 123–27.
12 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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in 1914. Debates turned on both substance and process. What role, if
any, should antitrust play in economic ordering? What role, if any,
should a commission play in implementing either competition policy or
an alternative to such policy?13 Even among Progressives, there were sub-
stantial differences in the responses, and those differences echoed
through the 1920s. Further, differences among politicians also paral-
leled those among economists. Particularly in the early years, many
economists thought antitrust to be fundamentally misguided because
they believed it failed to account sufficiently for scale economies and the
problem of fixed costs—the belief that firms with high fixed costs would
be driven to marginal cost pricing and face “ruinous competition.”14
Theodore Roosevelt (TR), the former Republican President, was now
standard-bearer for a new Progressive Party. Though known as a “trust-
buster,” TR publicly doubted antitrust as early as 1899. He associated
size, however obtained, with efficiency. By 1912, he spoke favorably of
German cartels and decried the structural remedy in Standard Oil; TR
argued that the Court should have instead put the firm under a receiver-
ship to reform its conduct. His “New Nationalism” advocated an agency
to enforce fair competition, even to the point of setting prices, and also
protect consumers, investors, and employees. To that end, he secured a
1903 law that created the Bureau of Corporations within the Commerce
Department; the Bureau was the FTC’s predecessor in the sense that it
would eventually be absorbed into the FTC. He promoted a 1908 initia-
tive that would provide certain protections to mergers and agreements
that were cleared through the Bureau. Finally, in 1914 his party’s small
House contingent, led by future Commissioner Victor Murdock, ad-
vanced legislation to create an agency that would identify substantial
monopolistic power. If the source of that power was “artificial,” the
agency would proscribe the “unfair and oppressive” practices that pro-
duced it. If “natural,” the agency would address it by other means. Those
might include, Murdock said, “the separation of one factor of the busi-
ness, establishing either its independence or its subjection to the obliga-
tions of public service [including price regulation].”15
13 See generally Marc Winerman, The Origins of the Federal Trade Commission: Concentration,
Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Origins].
14 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, ch. 23 (1991);
Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV.
311 (2009). Hovenkamp notes that a consensus began to emerge by the 1920s that such
problems were restricted to a few industries and highlights the role of developments in
the 1930s relating to product differentiation and monopolistic competition. For a sympa-
thetic treatment of “ruinous competition,” see GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE
MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION, 1900–1932 (2009).
15 51 CONG. REC. 8980 (1914); Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 15–27 (discussing
TR and his antitrust philosophy), 60–62 (discussing the 1914 Progressive Party legisla-
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The other major candidates were more skeptical of the desirability of
commissions and large firms. William Howard Taft, the Republican in-
cumbent, and Woodrow Wilson, the successful Democratic challenger,
both advocated deconcentration, though differing in how to attain it.
Taft was a former judge and future Chief Justice. For Taft circa 1912,
courts should administer trust policy and wield remedial authority ag-
gressively.16 For Wilson, Congress should work with the President to for-
mulate a legislative agenda. In antitrust, that agenda should include
precisely defined violations and harsh punishments, including jail, for
individual violators. Wilson, who dubbed his program “The New Free-
dom,” was suspicious of firms that grew through consolidations, but he
emphasized the ingenuity of new entrants and anticipated that they
would thrive once incumbents, however entrenched in the past, had to
compete fairly in the future. Though his later actions suggest that he
may have changed on this score, in 1911, he even opposed breaking up
Standard Oil, so confident was he that upstarts could topple the giant
once it had to compete fairly. Wilson in 1912 had little stake in a com-
mission and criticized government by a “smug lot of experts.” Still, the
commission idea had sufficient traction that he said that he was “not
afraid” of one.17
Two prominent Wilson allies, William Jennings Bryan and Louis Bran-
deis, represented other “anti-monopoly” views that were often conflated
with Wilson’s.  Both tended to emphasize more than did Wilson the
preservation of small business—although, from their perspective, this
was (at least generally) not inconsistent with an efficiency-focused anti-
trust.18 Bryan, a three-time Presidential nominee, spoke for many agra-
rian anti-monopolists who talked of “theft” in discussing trusts; his
party’s 1908 platform proposed to bar firms with a 50 percent market
tion). The article also discusses various theories about why TR, despite his doubts, became
a “trustbuster.” Id. at 17. The 1908 proposal anticipated, in part, the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
16 See Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 27–32 (discussing Taft and his antitrust phi-
losophy). As a circuit court judge, Taft had written the leading antitrust decision in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
17 See Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 46–48; Campaign Speech of Sept. 17, 1912,
in 25 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 148, 154 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978) [hereinafter
PWW]; Campaign Speech of Sept. 25, 1912, id. at 245, 251; see also JOHN MILTON COOPER,
WOODROW WILSON 226–36 (2009).
18 See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitu-
tional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1910, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 299 (1989) (discussing classi-
cal paradigm that assumed consistency of opportunity, efficiency, competition, fair
distribution, and political freedom). See id. at 309, 391–95 (detailed discussion of this
paradigm and its importance for antitrust (and constitutional law) in the Progressive
Era).
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share from interstate commerce.19 Brandeis, a more subtle and idiosyn-
cratic thinker, fused antimonopolism with commitments to various
forms of efficiency, both economic and “social.” Though he conceded
that an efficient firm might be “too large to be tolerated among the
people who desire to be free,”20 his primary theme was that the largest
firms were inefficient. He sought to “regulate competition” and not
“regulate monopoly.”21
Brandeis also advocated collective activities through trade associa-
tions. For Brandeis, smaller firms could use associations to neutralize
advantages of larger competitors, particularly advantages involving ac-
cess to information. To that end, he wanted the FTC to promote uni-
form cost accounting so firms could better understand their cost
structures, and he contemplated that competitors would learn by shar-
ing information about costs and prices.22
Another important associationalist, though less prominent in the de-
bates of 1912 and 1914, pressed even broader themes, and is important
to our story for his later influence. Arthur Jerome Eddy argued that
“open prices” were essential to “true” competition. To deal with both
trusts and “ruinous competition,” he proposed full disclosure of prices
paid and a concomitant ban on secret rebates; a ban on below-cost pric-
ing along with uniform cost accounting to measure cost; a price um-
brella to protect less efficient competitors; and, to deal with trusts, a
requirement that integrated firms disclose information about their indi-
vidual units and face sanctions, perhaps with treble damages, if they sold
materials to their own units for less than they charged others.23
Even before the legislative debates, the FTC thus had multiple parents
with multiple visions. Comparable differences divided its Congressional
advocates. Some were in a Bryanite tradition (although many in that
19 See Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 19, n.105.
20 U.S. SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COM., 62D CONG., CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS,
PERSONS, AND FIRMS ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE 1174 (1911) (Report of the Com-
mittee pursuant to S. Res. 98).
21 See generally Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 32–38 (for Brandeis); see also MELVIN
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE ch. 13 (2009) (concluding that the core of Brandeis’s
views on trusts was moral, not economic).
22 Statement of Louis D. Brandeis Before the Federal Trade Commission 9–20 (Apr. 30,
1915) (available in FTC library). See also Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377, 413–19 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23 See, e.g., ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION 116, 251, 292, 353–57 (4th ed.
1915). While Eddy did not define the term “below cost,” one commentator concludes that
the term was often meant to cover fixed costs, variable costs, and a “fair rate of return” on
investment. Butler D. Shaffer, In Restraint of Trade: Trade Associations and the Emergence of
“Self Regulation,” 20 SW. U. L. REV. 289, 317 (1991).
154 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77
tradition distrusted a commission). Francis Newlands, the Democrats’
principal spokesman, argued for a New Freedom approach while
scarcely hiding his attraction to TR’s New Nationalism. Albert Cummins,
a progressive Republican, advocated a relatively sophisticated antimono-
polism. Others of course opposed the bill—also anticipating a position
that would have strong advocates in the next decade.24
The 1914 legislation resolved these debates at most in part. The Clay-
ton Act forbade certain conduct, including certain price discrimina-
tions, vertical arrangements, and mergers, with greater specificity and
(seemingly) broader scope than the Sherman Act. The FTC Act created
an “independent” commission.25 It was empowered to enforce a new
prohibition, in Section 5 of the Act, against unfair methods of competi-
tion (UMC or unfair methods); share enforcement authority under the
Clayton Act with the DOJ and others; conduct investigations; and issue
reports. It would draw expertise and be shielded from political pres-
sures, the theory went, by its multi-member, bipartisan composition. No
more than three of its five members could come from any political
party. The meaning of UMC was sufficiently unclear, though, and the
FTC’s mandate sufficiently broad, that different progressives could hope
that the agency might evolve in different ways. These aspirations were
reflected, in the 1920s, in various approaches (or reactions) to antitrust,
each with roots in the Progressive years.
In discussing these approaches, though, we note that their content
sometimes blurs. Thus, Brandeis and Wilson both spoke for the New
Freedom, though their ideas differed; Wilson’s own ideas likely evolved
over time. Further, the boundaries separating them often blurred. Thus,
Brandeis spoke for both the New Freedom and associationalism; the
New Nationalism shared with some associationalists a concern with ruin-
ous competition. The New Freedom and the New Nationalism might
both accept strong conduct remedies, though perhaps with differing de-
grees of enthusiasm. TR, Taft, Wilson, and Bryan might disagree about
the proper remedy for Standard Oil’s conduct, but all agreed that its
conduct warranted some remedy. For all of these reasons, many enforce-
ment initiatives might be compatible with more than one program.
24 Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 74–88. See also ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE ROOTS
OF REFORM (1999).
25 The principal characteristic of its independence was that Commissioners could be
removed only for cause. See 15 U.S.C. § 41. Then as now, members of Congress have
tended to view “independence” primarily as freedom from political control by the execu-
tive branch. See 51 CONG. REC. 13,047–48 (1914) (Senator Albert Cummins declaring
the agency “always subordinate to Congress. . . . Congress can always destroy the
Commission”).
2010] OUTPOST YEARS FOR A START-UP AGENCY 155
There were, however, some markers that distinguish the programs.
Highly regulatory solutions suggest the New Nationalism; aggressive di-
vestiture cases were most compatible with a Bryanite program and some
variants of the New Freedom. Strong restraints on information sharing
tend to be objectionable to associationalists and most compatible with
the New Freedom. New Freedom advocates rarely referred to “ruinous
competition”; associationalists or New Nationalists often did so. Even for
Bryanites, it was rare expressly to reject efficiency as a goal,26 but, eventu-
ally, such rejection would be most likely from the descendants of the
early agrarian antimonopolists.
The multiplicity of conceptions about the purposes to be served by
the FTC and the varied expectations about how it would use its authority
had major, lasting implications for the Commission and underscore an
important point about the formation of new competition systems. The
establishment of the FTC introduced a phenomenon that has recurred
in many other countries in the adoption of a competition law. Legisla-
tures seldom enact a competition law with a clear, coherent vision about
its appropriate aims. Instead, the original law is likely to embody a mix
of objectives—some complementary, others conflicting. Given an often
wide array of policy aims, it is left to the agency to reconcile objectives
and formulate an effective program. This inevitably is a difficult and, at
times, bewildering assignment, particularly in a multi-member commis-
sion whose members have their own divergences. As we will see below,
the Commission experimented with a variety of approaches to imple-
ment the open-ended, multifaceted mandate of the 1914 legislation.
This yielded some policy successes, yet also produced some activities
that, in hindsight, cannot be said to be consistent with a fully coherent
policy or animating philosophy.
B. THE WILSON-ERA COMMISSION
It fell to Wilson to select Commissioners to give content to these vary-
ing views, sorting out the agency’s goals from the ambiguities in its crea-
tion. Unfortunately, the original agency lineup had no superstar.
(Brandeis declined a spot and soon got a better offer.27) Distrusting law-
yers and economists alike, Wilson included in his original Commission-
26 See James May, supra note 18 (noting that classical paradigm saw efficiency as consis-
tent with other goals antitrust sought to promote).
27 1929 Interview, Ray Stannard Baker Papers, Reel 72, Manuscript Collection, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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ers only two of the former and none of the latter.28 Further, despite
significant Republican support for the FTC Act, Wilson did not consult
with Republicans about his appointments and, for the seats that could
not go to Democrats in 1915, he chose two members of TR’s not-yet-
moribund Progressive Party.29
Starting an agency with the Commission’s broad but mixed mandate
would have been a challenge under the best of circumstances, and con-
ditions in the FTC’s early years were far from ideal. The expected bene-
fits of governance by a board whose members served fixed seven-year
terms were elusive in practice. High turnover among the Commissioners
marred the agency’s first years.30 The FTC, moreover, was created in the
shadow of war. World War I erupted during the 1914 debates. After the
United States became a belligerent in April 1917, antitrust was virtually
suspended through November 1918. Wartime mobilization required
broad economic regulation under such agencies as Bernard Baruch’s
War Industries Board and Herbert Hoover’s Food Administration and
even nationalization of the railroads; further, the cooperation of busi-
nesses with each other and with the government under Baruch’s board
was a catalyst for subsequent cooperation, and blunted somewhat the
antimonopoly tradition during the 1920s.31 The FTC played a secondary
role in these efforts. Though its staff quadrupled (only to halve again
after the war), it served largely as a cost-finding agency for other
agencies.32
Unexpectedly rapid turnover on the board diminished the stability
and effectiveness of the agency’s leadership, and the regulatory de-
mands of the war mobilization imposed unanticipated duties that ab-
sorbed substantial FTC resources. Nonetheless, the Wilson-era FTC
undertook important initiatives. Some yielded substantial policy results.
Its 1916 report on foreign trade led to the Webb-Pomerene Act, which
created an antitrust exemption for export trade activities by associations
28 See Samuel Huston Thompson to Wilson (Jan. 15, 1917), 40 PWW (1982), supra note
17, at 490 (noting Wilson’s concern that lawyers “as a rule immediately tie the hands or
powers up in technical legal limitations”); see also supra note 17.
29 Scott James detects in this an appeal for purposes of the 1916 election to voters who
had backed TR in 1912. SCOTT C. JAMES, PRESIDENTS, PARTIES AND THE STATE ch. 3 (2000).
30 The original five were gone within thirty-nine months, and two more departed while
Wilson remained President. See Commissioners and Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/commisionerchartlegal2010.pdf.
31 See, e.g., ROBERT D. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELA-
TIONS DURING WORLD WAR I (1973); Robert A. Himmelberg, The War Industries Board and
the Antitrust Question in November 1918, 52 J. AM. HIST. 59, 60 (1965).
32 See W.H.S. Stevens, What Has the Federal Trade Commission Accomplished, 15 AM. ECON.
REV. 625, 636–37 (1925); FTC Staff and Budget Information, 1915–2000, supra note 8.
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that properly registered with the agency;33 by 1918, the FTC had an ex-
port trade division (a precursor to its current international office),
which handled Webb-Pomerene filings, responded to complaints
against U.S. firms, and recommended enforcement actions, under the
Act, for UMC in international trade.34 Some FTC programs inspired
sharp controversy. Its meatpacking investigation, discussed further be-
low, led into its first political buzz saw and a struggle that would echo for
years. Some measures were largely failures, including key portions of its
early adjudicative program. Finally, some measures echoed one or more
or the visions that produced the agency. A 1919 report, for example,
recommended legalizing resale price maintenance, but with heavy regu-
lation that was reminiscent of the New Nationalism: agreements and
prices would have to be filed with a designated agency, with authority to
review them.35
II. THE 1920s IN ECONOMIC CONTEXT
The 1920s began with post-war price swings and recession, but the
post-war doldrums ended in 1922. The country then entered a period of
prosperity that lasted until 1929, though the prosperity was uneven; the
coal sector and substantial portions of the agricultural sector, for exam-
ple, shared less or little in improved times.36 The consumer economy
expanded broadly.37 Growth continued from the Progressive Era,38 but
with sufficient magnitude to change the national landscape dramati-
cally. Car ownership more than tripled over the decade, for example,
reaching over half of American families, and a wider variety of models,
33 40 Stat. 516 (1918); FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN FEDERAL EX-
PORT TRADE (1916).
34 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1923, at 80, 87 [hereinafter 1923 ANNUAL REPORT];
15 U.S.C. § 64 (1918 provision extending FTC’s authority to UMC “used in export trade
against competitors engaged in export trade, even though the acts constituting such un-
fair methods are done without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”).
35 REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, H.R. DOC. NO. 165, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1918).
36 See generally MICHAEL PARRISH, ANXIOUS DECADES, AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRES-
SION, 1920–41, at 81–85 (1992); ROBERT H. FERRELL, THE PRESIDENCY OF CALVIN COO-
LIDGE ch. 5 (1998).
37 See generally PARRISH, supra note 36, at 29–46.
38 See, e.g., MORTON G. KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECO-
NOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 11 (1990) (traditional historical focus on polit-
ics and the tone of culture obscured continuities in economic experience, perception,
and policy); Arthur S. Link, What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920s?, 64 AM.
HIST. REV. 833 (1959) (summarizing work done even before relevant Presidential records
were available).
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with annual style changes, were used to create new demand.39 Electrical
power came to more and more homes. Mass entertainment developed
in radio and movies.40 Advertising trumpeted the virtues of a growing
number of branded products, and new forms of credit facilitated sales.41
Meanwhile, industry became increasingly concentrated. A new
merger wave generally saw “mergers to oligopoly,” unlike the earlier
“mergers to monopoly” that produced such giants as U.S. Steel.42 Fur-
ther, while mergers to monopoly were not the rule, the burgeoning elec-
trical industry quickly consolidated under holding companies. Retailing
and distribution also changed, as national “chain stores” like the Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P) expanded.43
These developments had major implications for the FTC. This was a
period of extraordinary technological and organizational dynamism.
The forces reshaping the U.S. economy in the 1920s seemed no less
astonishing or challenging than those today. FTC officials strained to
analyze markets amid technological upheaval that displaced older prod-
ucts and processes. Revolutionary changes in transportation and com-
munication altered market boundaries. Broad ownership of cars altered
shopping habits and helped inspire the emergence of new forms of re-
tailers to serve increasingly mobile customers. Radio networks would
make it possible for advertisers to reach ever larger bodies of potential
customers with great speed.
In theory, the FTC was well positioned to address these developments.
Its data collection, research, and reporting powers gave it valuable tools
for studying new commercial developments and understanding their sig-
nificance. The agency’s elastic mandate positioned it to apply existing
rules to new phenomena, or to establish principles not previously em-
bodied in Sherman Act or common law jurisprudence. Its mandate also
permitted the formation of programs to treat what we now call con-
sumer protection problems arising from new methods of advertising
and marketing. In many instances, the specific Commission programs
we discuss below sought to use the agency’s broad collection of policy
instruments to achieve these ends.
39 HAWLEY, GREAT WAR, supra note 3, at 71. General Motors, which introduced a variety
of styles and annual changes, overtook Ford because Henry Ford resisted such changes.
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1920–2000: HOW IT WORKED 11–27 (2000).
40 Between 1922 and 1929, sales of movie tickets rose from 40 million weekly to nearly
100 million. The radio industry began in 1920 and, by 1929, about 40 percent of house-
holds owned a radio. HAWLEY, GREAT WAR, supra note 3, at 71.
41 KELLER, supra note 38, at 13–14.
42 See George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 23 (1950).
43 See, e.g., PARRISH, supra note 36, at 75.
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III. THE FTC AND THE 1920s IN POLITICAL CONTEXT
The Progressive Era began under the Republican Roosevelt; by 1912,
the Democrats controlled both the White House and Congress, a rarity
in the post-Civil War Era. The Democrats, though, lost Congress by 1918
and the White House in 1920.44 1920 also saw the end of the Progressive
Era. While important Progressive elements survived into the 1920s,45 the
Era had embroiled the country in crusades—a crusade to manage indus-
trialization, a crusade against alcohol, a war that Wilson trumpeted as a
crusade to make the world safe for democracy. The last overwhelmed
the others and ended with Wilson’s failed attempt to create an interna-
tional order around a League of Nations. By 1920, Wilson had been
crippled by a stroke, the country faced economic downturn, and (in
part because Wilson’s refusal to compromise) the Senate refused to rat-
ify the treaty creating the League.46
A. WARREN G. HARDING AND THE 1920 ELECTION
Theodore Roosevelt seemed poised to dominate the 1920 election
when he died in January 1919.47 It is unclear that even TR, had he re-
turned to office, could have roused America to further crusades. With-
out him, the time had passed. A divided Republican convention ratified
a deal struck in the proverbial smoke-filled room and nominated Ohio
Senator Warren G. Harding; then the delegates asserted their indepen-
dence by selecting Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge as his run-
ning mate.48 The two won in a landslide, with over 60 percent of the
popular vote, and the Republicans emerged with 302 of 435 House
seats, and 59 of 96 in the Senate.49
Harding, who promised a return to “normalcy,” had been a newspa-
per editor and a relatively inconsequential Senator.50 He did have firm
44 Wilson prevailed in the three-way contest with 42 percent of the popular vote. He
barely withstood a challenge in 1916 from Charles Evan Hughes, while the Democrat’s




45 See, e.g., Link, supra note 38.
46 See PARRISH, supra note 36, at 6.
47 EUGENE P. TRANI & DAVID L. WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF WARREN G. HARDING 21
(1977). Despite his apostasy in 1912, TR returned to the Republicans in 1916.
48 Id. at 22–23. The Coolidge nomination was triggered by an impassioned nominating
speech.
49 Election Results, supra note 44.
50 PARRISH, supra note 36, at 8 (Harding “had not written a single piece of important
legislation, been hanged in effigy, or been raked by opponents on either the right or left
of the political spectrum”). For views as to how he was nominated, compare TRANI &
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commitments, particularly to cutting war-time tax rates, managing gov-
ernment spending, and paying down the war-time deficit; in these he
aligned with Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon (1921–32). However, he
also made gestures to progressives,51 and, aside from Mellon, his most
impressive appointees had progressive credentials. Over the objections
of more traditional elements in his party, he chose Charles Evan Hughes
as Secretary of State and Henry C. Wallace for Agriculture,52 and, most
importantly for the FTC, Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce.
Hoover, who was close to Harding, was then a noted progressive.53 He
had risen from poverty to international success as a mining engineer
and businessman, contributed to TR’s 1912 campaign, been Food Ad-
ministrator in Wilson’s war cabinet, and, before and after the War, or-
ganized food relief for Europe. He joined Wilson at the Versailles peace
negotiations, where he impressed John Maynard Keynes; Franklin
Roosevelt and Louis Brandeis backed him for the Democratic nomina-
tion in 1920.54
Although Harding chose many able leaders, others became embroiled
in scandal. The most famous scandal (involving bribes for oil leases at
Teapot Dome) did not touch the FTC, but other scandals involving At-
torney General Harry Daugherty did. Daugherty, Harding’s friend from
Ohio and campaign manager, was never convicted of a crime, though
he was tried twice. However, his friend Jess Smith committed suicide in
Daugherty’s apartment as rumors spread about Smith’s influence ped-
WILSON, supra note 47, at 22–23 (ran for President mainly to strengthen his position for
his Senate race) with JOHN W. DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING 43–44 (2004) (in politics as in
poker, Harding “was always congenial and enjoyed himself, but he, too, played the game
more seriously than most realized—and he seldom lost”).
51 For example, Harding pardoned the socialist Eugene Debs, who had been jailed for
anti-war activities, and invited him to the White House. With Hebert Hoover, he per-
suaded U.S. Steel to cut its work day from twelve hours to eight. PARRISH, supra note 36, at
25. Hoover’s influence as Secretary of Commerce during the Harding Administration is
discussed in Robert K. Murray, Herbert Hoover and the Harding Cabinet, in HERBERT HOOVER
AS SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, 1921–28, at 17–40 (Ellis W. Hawley ed., 1974).
52 On Harding’s cabinet, see PARRISH, supra note 36, at 11–21; TRANI & WILSON, supra
note 47, at 38–45; Murray, supra note 51. Hughes was a former Supreme Court Justice,
Presidential nominee, and private practitioner, and a future Chief Justice. Wallace, a for-
mer farmer and publisher of an agricultural journal, was a moderate progressive who
often worked closely with the farm bloc, as discussed below. DONALD L. WINTERS, HENRY
CANTWELL WALLACE AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 78–79 (1970); TRANI & WILSON, supra
note 47, at 39, 66, 69–70.
53 Murray, supra note 51, at 34 (close relationship with Harding); Ellis W. Hawley, Her-
bert Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After, in HERBERT HOOVER AND THE
HISTORIANS 1 (Mark M. Dodge ed., 1989) (placing Hoover’s early progressivism in con-
text, and noting, at 2, that Hoover’s own later writings tended to obscure that
progressivism).
54 PARRISH, supra note 36, at 20; KENDRICK A. CLEMENTS, HERBERT HOOVER: IMPERFECT
VISIONARY 25 (2010).
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dling. In the midst of Congressional hearings, with an FTC Commis-
sioner as a prominent witness, Coolidge asked Daugherty to resign.55
Congress’s confrontations with the Administration went beyond scan-
dals, moreover, and relations between Congress (particularly the Sen-
ate) and Harding would also have an impact on the FTC. The key was a
Congressional bloc—mostly Republican, Midwestern, and (at least in
some sense) progressive. In 1921, they coalesced in a bi-partisan “farm
bloc,” sometimes working with Secretary Wallace; some Senators from
agrarian states also formed a less formal progressive bloc. The bipartisan
farm bloc often made a mockery of nominal Republican control.56 Insti-
tutional prerogatives added to interbranch tension. The Senate had
been troubled by TR’s and Wilson’s aggrandizement of the Presidency.
Former Senator Harding was at first sympathetic to such complaints,
though he was soon asserting his positions in disputes with the Hill.57
The Republicans suffered significant midterm losses in 1922.58 The
next August, with scandals erupting, Harding died.
B. HARDING AND THE FTC
Early in his Presidency, Harding sought the FTC’s views on how to
address “The High Cost of Living,” and the FTC replied by letter.59 By
late 1922, though, the FTC’s relations with the Justice Department, at
least, had deteriorated. Representative Oscar Keller prepared a bill to
impeach Daugherty, and its first counts detailed FTC referrals that the
DOJ had not yet pursued.60
Many of these referrals involved trade associations, the treatment of
which weaves through the decade in an intricate dance involving the
FTC and the Justice and Commerce Departments. Under Daugherty,
the DOJ actually pursued a sometimes aggressive course (if insufficiently
aggressive for the FTC) over Hoover’s objections. Hoover was a Progres-
55 FERRELL, supra note 36; see also infra note 74 and accompanying text.
56 WINTERS, supra note 52, at 73–77; FERRELL, supra note 36, at 42 (suggesting that the
bloc as a whole was essentially “conservative on everything but the problems of farmers”);
id. ch. 5 (discussing tensions throughout the Coolidge years). According to a 1921 press
report, the farm bloc guarded the agency from efforts to abolish it. Farm Bloc Guards Trade
Commission, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Oct. 22, 1921, at 1.
57 See generally TRANI & WILSON, supra note 47, ch. 3.
58 They dropped 77 seats from their 1920 House total to retain 225 seats out of 435, and
6 seats from their 1920 Senate total to retain 53 of 96. Election Results, supra note 44.
59 Letter of the Federal Trade Commission to the President of the United States
(1921).
60 Charges of Oscar E. Keller Against the Att’y Gen. and the Att’y Gen.’s Answers Thereto, Hear-
ing on H.R. Res. 425 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. (1922).
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sive of the associational variety. From his post at Commerce, he en-
couraged private information sharing and developed a substantial
government program to collect and disseminate data. When the Justice
Department, prodded by the FTC and others, sought to interpret the
Sherman Act to strictly limit information sharing, Hoover sought to ex-
pand those boundaries. On the other hand, he highlighted that cooper-
ation was needed to preserve individual initiative and rejected price
fixing and similar conduct.61
Meanwhile, progressives in Congress frequently turned to the FTC.
During this Presidential term, Senate resolutions triggered numerous
FTC investigations. Some Senators, among them Robert La Follette,
were important allies.62
Harding filled one FTC vacancy in early 1922.63 His first choice,
George Upton of Ohio, drew fire for reasons that have hardly been con-
sistently applied: he was unqualified and named to pay a political debt.64
Harding withdrew the nomination, and then chose Vernon Van Fleet.
C. CALVIN COOLIDGE AND THE 1924 ELECTION
Calvin Coolidge was born and raised in Vermont and graduated from
Amherst. He practiced law in Massachusetts, where he read for the bar,
and later became Governor. He gained national fame in 1919 after a
strike by Boston police that he helped break. Refusing to reinstate the
strikers, Coolidge then declared: “There is no right to strike against the
public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time.” This was the basis for the
61 For Hoover’s ideas, see HERBERT HOOVER, AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM 9–10, 33–34
(1922) (individual initiative key to stimulating innovation); CLEMENTS, supra note 54, at
196–201; HIMMELBERG, supra note 5, at 10–11. For the interactions of Justice, Commerce
and the FTC during these years, see generally HIMMELBERG, supra, chs. 1–4; CLEMENTS,
supra note 54, at 202–05. The Supreme Court’s decision in American Column and Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), rejected a plan under which, among other things,
information was disseminated on a weekly basis about specific past sales. A later case,
initiated by Daugherty but decided against the government, would ultimately find sub-
stantial room to share aggregated statistics. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563 (1925).
62 In 1963, former Commissioner Thompson noted four “genuine allies” in the Senate
(La Follette, George Norris, Hiram Johnson, and Thomas J. Walsh. George Cullom Da-
vis). The Federal Trade Commission, Promise and Practice in Regulating Business (1969)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois). See also infra note 221 and accom-
panying text (discussing source of FTC’s studies).
63 Commissioners’ terms expire on September 26, the anniversary of the FTC Act. Since
the five Commissioners serve seven year terms, vacancies occur by reason of expired terms
five years of seven. None occurred in 1922 or 1923.
64 Harding Withdraws Nomination of Upton, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1922, at 17. On the sub-
ject of unqualified Commissioners, see William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and
the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915 (1997).
2010] OUTPOST YEARS FOR A START-UP AGENCY 163
1920 delegates’ rebellion, when they rejected party leaders’ choice and
ran Coolidge for Vice President. Though known as “Silent Cal,” Coo-
lidge had cordial relations with the press. He had a strong work ethic at
first, though that seems to have changed after his son died during the
1924 campaign.65
Coolidge’s rectitude and actions provided damage control for Har-
ding’s scandals.66 Like Harding, he was committed to limiting govern-
ment expenses and lowering taxes; also, he was less inclined to interfere
with business than Harding had been.67 At the cabinet level, Wallace
soon died, Hughes left, and Coolidge asked Daugherty to leave. Mel-
lon’s influence waxed and Hoover’s waned; Coolidge called Hoover the
source of non-stop bad advice, though he did little to interfere with
Hoover’s work at Commerce.68
To replace Daugherty, Coolidge named Harlan Fiske Stone, who had
attended Amherst with Coolidge and was Dean of Columbia Law
School. Stone’s integrity brought to the DOJ the same corrective that
Coolidge brought to the White House. During his short stay, Stone sig-
naled an intent to bring aggressive antitrust cases, including a possible
challenge to the Aluminum Company of America that the FTC was
pressing. Such a step would have indirectly challenged Mellon, who was
deeply associated with the firm. There was speculation that Stone was
named to the Supreme Court in 1925 as a roundabout way to stop his
aggressive antitrust agenda.69
65 FERRELL, supra note 36, chs. 1–2; DAVID GREENBERG, CALVIN COOLIDGE chs. 1–2
(2006); Kerry W. Buckley, A President for the “Great Silent Majority”: Bruce Barton’s Construc-
tion of Calvin Coolidge, 76 NEW. ENG. Q. 593 (2003) (role of Barton, an Amherst graduate
and partner in the advertising firm of BBD&O, as a Coolidge adviser); ROBERT GILBERT,
THE TORMENTED PRESIDENT (2003) (arguing that his son’s death left Coolidge clinically
depressed); ROBERT SOBEL, CALVIN COOLIDGE 309 (1998) (Coolidge’s changed work hab-
its after his son died). See generally THOMAS B. SILVER, COOLIDGE AND THE HISTORIANS
(1983) (challenging early histories of Coolidge).
66 FERRELL, supra note 36, at 44–51.
67 Coolidge’s views were more nuanced, however, than suggested by the partial quote
often attributed to him. In explaining why it was not worrisome that journalism was a
business, Coolidge said that,“[t]he chief business of America is business,” and continued:
“[W]e want wealth, but there are many other things we want much more. . . . The chief
ideal of the American people is idealism. . . . No newspaper can be a success which fails to
appeal to that element of our national life.” Calvin Coolidge, President of the United
States, Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (Jan. 17, 1925), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24180.
68 SOBEL, supra note 65, at 241–43, 264–67; FERRELL, supra note 36, at 28–32, 64–66.
Ferrell argues, though, that Hoover was implementing Coolidge’s policies, and Coolidge
turned against him only because of Hoover’s personal ambition. Id. at 66.
69 ALPHEUS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 179–85 (1956); SOBEL,
supra note 65, at 318. FDR would name Stone Chief Justice in 1941.
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Coolidge won re-election by a landslide in 1924. La Follette mounted
a third-party campaign under the name of TR’s 1912 Progressive Party,
though the effort was less successful than TR’s.70 The Republicans also
enjoyed electoral success in Congress, particularly in gaining 22 House
seats above their 1922 total to control 247 seats.71
D. COOLIDGE AND THE FTC
During Coolidge’s short first term, relations between the White
House and the FTC deteriorated. Coolidge did ask the Commission for
an investigation that led quickly to litigation and another into sharp in-
creases in gasoline prices, though in his first State of the Union address
he declared “[r]evision of procedure of the Federal Trade Commission
will give more constructive purpose to this department.”72
In addition to the FTC’s aggressive agenda, four incidents in 1924
point to strains between the White House and the agency, with Huston
Thompson at the center. In February, Thompson’s testimony at a Sen-
ate hearing forced Coolidge to withdraw a nominee to a Commission
seat.73 Next, he testified at the Daugherty impeachment hearings.74
Then, when the White House asked about the FTC’s progress in investi-
gating gasoline prices, his reply as FTC Chair documented the agency’s
budget woes, laying blame on the recently created Bureau of the
Budget.75 Finally, a month before the election, the FTC recommended
that the DOJ seek contempt against the Aluminum Company of
America for violating a 1912 consent order. Reporting on the story, the
70 TR had held Wilson to 42 percent of the popular vote, himself receiving 27 percent
and running second. Coolidge won 54 percent with La Follette a distant third at 16 per-
cent. Election Results, supra note 44.
71 Id. They also emerged with 54 (of 96) Senate seats.
72 See infra note 184 and accompanying text (coal case); 1924 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 8, at 192; Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States, First Annual Message
(Dec. 6, 1923), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29564.
73 Coolidge nominated George Christian, who had been an associate of Harding’s from
Ohio and the President’s Secretary (a position somewhat akin to Chief of Staff) during
Harding’s Presidency. Thompson accused Christian of pressuring the FTC in May 1921
about the FTC’s investigation of the motion picture industry. Christian Favored for Trade
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1924, at 5; Accuse Harding Aid of Trying to Help Film Firm, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., Feb. 17, 1924, at 3; Coolidge Recalls Christian’s Name, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1924,
at 1.
74 Investigation of the Att’y Gen., Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 157 Before the S. Select Comm. on
Investigation of the Att’y Gen., 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1692–744 (1924); Investigation of Harry
M. Daugherty, Formerly Att’y Gen. of the United States, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res 157, Before the
S. Select Comm. on Investigation of the Att’y Gen., 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1805–25 (1924);
Charges Daugherty Let “Trusts” Alone, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1924, at 3.
75 Huston Thompson, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n to C. Bascom Slemp (Mar. 25,
1924), Calvin Coolidge Papers, File 100, Reel 68, Manuscript Collection, Library of Con-
gress, Washington, D.C.
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Chicago Tribune focused on Thompson, calling him a “radical Demo-
crat,” noting that he had been considered for the La Follette ticket, and
deeming the challenge political because of Mellon’s connection with
the firm.76
IV. THE FTC’S OUTPOST YEARS: THE CONDUCT OF
AGENCY BUSINESS
The formation of the FTC raised enduring issues about the govern-
ance mechanism for a competition agency. Should it be headed by a
single executive or governed by a college? How are its operating units
and key functions to be organized, and what is to be the relationship
among them? If a college is the chosen leadership method, what alloca-
tion of decisionmaking tasks among the board members will provide the
most effective form of management? For an independent agency, what
is the appropriate relationship with the executive and legislature? How
should priorities and strategies be set? In this part of the article we ad-
dress how the FTC sought to address important matters of governance
within a regulatory structure—a multi-member “independent” agency—
that was still relatively novel within the federal government.
A. THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS BY THE COMMISSIONERS
The early conduct of FTC business was different from today. The
agency Chairmanship was inherently weak. Until 1950, the Commission-
ers chose their own Chair and, after 1916, they rotated the position an-
nually.77 The Chair presided over meetings, but was not yet the
executive and administrative head of the agency. Each Commissioner
oversaw one or more offices,78 and Commissioners often deliberated
(and sometimes dissented) on such matters as office space allocation
and individual employees’ pay.79 Until the 1960s, they conducted collec-
tive business only at meetings.80 They met often, sometimes for twenty or
76 Mellon Company Hit in Federal Trade Report, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 6, 1924, at 21.
77 Joseph E. Davies was elected Chair at the first meeting for his full term, but his col-
leagues later removed him and established the rotating Chairmanship.  ELIZABETH K.
MACLEAN, JOSEPH E. DAVIES: ENVOY TO THE SOVIETS 10–13 (1992); 1 FTC Min.1 (Mar. 16,
1915). Since 1950, the President chooses a Commissioner to serve as Chair and can shift
the position at will. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (1950). FTC
Minutes are available at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, RG-122, Docket
Section, Official Minutes of the Commissioners, 1915–49. Some are also available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/minutes/index.shtm.
78 E.g., 3 FTC Min. 660 (Mar. 17, 1920).
79 E.g., 5 FTC Min. 354–58 (Oct. 21, 1921).
80 Most deliberations today are conducted by written circulations. The Commissioners
rarely hold a formal meeting more than twice per month. At most meetings, they sit on
one side of a long table, joined by the Chief of Staff and an adviser to each Commissioner.
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more hours in a week.81 They had no personal advisers, and (with rare
exceptions) voted only if physically present.82 Commissioners could
make public their objections to specific actions, but they did not have
to, and often declined to do so.83 Also, until 1938, there was no provision
for a Commissioner to stay in office after his term expired and before a
successor was confirmed.84
B. AGENCY STAFF: SIZE, BUDGET, WORKLOAD, AND INTEGRATION
OF FUNCTIONS
The agency’s limited resources provide important context for the
1920s. In 1924 it had a staff of 309. This was before modern technology
reduced the number of support staff; thus, of this relatively small num-
ber, only ninety were lawyers, thirty economists, and twenty-nine ac-
countants. The lawyers were organized into functional units. The Chief
Examiner’s office handled pre-complaint investigations and housed the
hearing examiners (predecessors to today’s Administrative Law Judges).
The Chief Counsel’s office handled litigation, and in 1924 only thirty-
five lawyers were attached to that office.85 Further, big cases could be a
drain. Of twenty-eight trial lawyers in 1922, twenty-one were tied up on
seven major cases (often facing a “battery” of elite lawyers).86
This staff handled a substantial workload. First, the Commissioners
for a time assumed that they had to issue a formal complaint when they
had reason to believe that the law was violated and that a complaint
On the other side of the table are representatives of the relevant Bureaus and the General
Counsel’s office. Representatives of smaller Commission offices, such as the press office,
are also in the room, and staff can sit in the audience. Commissioners who are not physi-
cally present can participate by electronic hook-up, or they can authorize an adviser to
cast a proxy vote.
81 Thus, during the week of December 6, 1920, the Commissioners met for over twenty-
five hours, including over eight and a half hours of nonpublic meetings (five of them on a
Saturday) and sixteen hours of public hearings about basing point pricing. 4 FTC Min.
403–14 (Dec. 6–11, 1920). In 1921, they voted to meet regularly on Mondays, Wednesdays
and Fridays at ten o’clock, with a recess at half past noon. 5 FTC Min. 43–44 (May 24,
1921).
82 5 FTC Min. 211 (Aug. 22, 1921) (rescinding prior motion authorizing each Commis-
sioner to hire a “special expert” to be attached to his own office, because none had done
so). The minutes for each day began by listing Commissioners who were present and
those who were absent. In recording votes on specific matters, there was, in general, no
reference to the absent Commissioners. See, e.g., 8 FTC Min. 211–16 (Dec. 21, 1923).
83 4 FTC Min. 472–73 (Jan. 13, 1921) (authorizing certain dissents to be made public).
See also infra note 167 (Gaskill declining to make public his dissent on a major case).
84 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 1, 52 Stat. 111.
85 1924 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 4, 14, 22–25.
86 Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1924, Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm.
on Appropriations, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. at 76–77 (1923) (testimony of Commissioner
Murdock).
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would be in the public interest.87 Second, the agency often undertook
investigations at the behest of a single House of Congress (generally the
Senate)—and a single House could not provide supplemental funding.
Most staff recommendations were funneled through a Board of Re-
view, which contained, at various times, three to six staff members. The
Board would forward its recommendation to the Commissioner as-
signed to a matter, who would in turn present the Board’s views and his
own to the Commission.88 Early on, the Board included three lawyers
and three economists, but this was soon changed to two lawyers and one
economist. Around 1923, the economist’s spot was taken by a third law-
yer; when the Board was expanded to five in 1925, the new spots went to
lawyers as well,89 suggesting a reduction in the influence of economists.
This suggests a declining value placed on the integration of the
agency’s functions at the staff level, though other signals are mixed.90
Even more problematically, despite occasional advocacy for such an ap-
pointment (and the expectations of many early advocates for a Commis-
sion), no economist was named a Commissioner.91
C. AGENCY PROCESSES
The FTC Act authorized two main functions: administrative litigation
under Section 5, and studies and reports under Section 6. Section 6,
then as now, authorized the Commission to obtain data and (subject to
87 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n (June 29, 1921) (on application for a
complaint, the FTC has issued such complaint “as required by law, the public interest
appearing . . .”) (Press releases are available at the National Archive, College Park, Mary-
land, RG-122, Division of Legal and Public Records, Press Clippings, Notices and Re-
leases, 1918–1959. Box 148 covers September 1920 through the end of 1922, and Box 149
covers 1923 and 1924.) Better Business Bureaus and others filed repeated complaints.
E.g., 7 FTC Min. 203 (Apr. 26, 1923) (Unfair Competition Bureau of the Paint and Var-
nish Industry). The Commissioners eventually rejected the position that they lacked dis-
cretion to issue a complaint in these circumstances. See 7 FTC Min. 526 (Jan. 9, 1925).
88 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1921, at 7.
89 Stevens, supra note 32, at 638 n.33 (1925).
90 For example, the 1924 Annual Report noted that seventeen members of the eco-
nomic staff (including accountants) worked that year on litigation projects. 1924 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. However, a 1920 minute noted the assistant Chief Economist’s
protest “against the action of the Chief Counsel’s office in allowing the Commission to go
to the Circuit Court of Appeals in resale price maintenance cases on arguments which”
developed “little or nothing of the Economic practices.” 3 FTC Min. 589 (Jan. 23, 1920).
91 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge urged the nomination of Francis Walker, head of the
Bureau of Economics, and Harding had apparently made tentative commitments. File
memo (Apr. 27, 1922), File 100-A, Microfilm Roll 177, Warren G. Harding Papers,
Archives and Manuscript Division, Ohio Historical Soc. This failed effort was paralleled by
later attempts to obtain a seat for Willard F. Mueller in the 1960s and 1970s. See WILLARD
F. MUELLER, FIGHTING FOR ANTITRUST POLICY ch. 16 (2009).
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confidentiality constraints) publish reports. The procedures for adjudi-
cation, though, have changed substantially. Numerous changes affecting
hearing processes were mandated by the Administrative Procedure
Act.92 Also, until 1938 (for Section 5) and 1959 (for the Clayton Act),
respondents who violated an FTC order for which they had not sought
judicial review could face, at most, a court order (not civil penalties) in
an enforcement proceeding. Only if the court issued an order and they
later violated that order could they face sanctions with more teeth.93
V. THE COMMISSIONERS
As we have suggested above, the challenges facing the first generation
of FTC leadership were immense. The exceptional breadth of the
agency’s charter and the diversity of its policymaking tools created a
wide array of possible applications of the Commission’s authority. Add
to this the certainty that the early leadership of a new agency plays a
critical role in getting the institution off to a good start by assembling a
capable professional staff, building public awareness of the agency’s pur-
pose and work, setting priorities, and implementing programs. A new
institution needs both an initial team of skillful leaders and a process of
succession that sustains a high level of performance. All of these consid-
erations placed a premium on the appointment of skilled analysts and
effective leaders for the early FTC.
Seven Commissioners served during the Presidential term that began
in 1921. Significantly, Wilson’s nominees stopped racing to leave. Of the
seven who took office between March 1915 and March 1917, none
stayed more than thirty-nine months.94 The five he chose thereafter all
remained when Harding took office; four stayed through their terms;
and all but one (whose term expired) served at least five years. To give a
92 The Act, initially passed in 1946, among other things establishes the independence
of the Administrative Law Judge (initially called “hearing officers”) who, other than Com-
missioners, are the only persons who can conduct the FTC’s administrative trials. 15
U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
93 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46. Under Section 5, as amended in 1938, the FTC can obtain civil
penalties for violations of orders under the FTC Act, including orders for which respon-
dents do not seek timely review. 52 Stat. 11 (1938); see also 15 U.S.C. § 21, as amended by
Pub. L. 86-107, 73 Stat. 243 (1959) (analog in Clayton Act). Under Section 13(b) of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), as added at 87 Stat. 592 (1973), the FTC can seek injunctions
and equitable remedies for law violations. The Commission often seeks preliminary in-
junctions (to preserve the status quo during an administrative trial) in merger cases, and
permanent injunctions (with such equitable remedies as redress) in fraud cases.
94 See Commissioners and Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 30.
Among the reasons for departure were health (one died in office) and ambition (two ran
for the Senate.)
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better sense of the agency’s evolving membership in the 1920s, we dis-
cuss the Wilson holdovers in the order that they left the agency.
A. JOHN GARLAND POLLARD (1920–21)
John Garland Pollard graduated from Columbian, now George Wash-
ington, Law School. He had a long career in Virginia politics, serving as
Attorney General (1914–18) and Governor (1930–34), and was the first
Director of the School of Government at William and Mary. He corre-
sponded with William Jennings Bryan, suggesting a Bryanite affinity but
also drawing on connections developed through their activities as South-
ern Baptists. For more than a decade after his term at the FTC expired,
he drew on other connections in efforts to return.95
B. VICTOR MURDOCK (1917–24)
Victor Murdock of Kansas was a journalist before he came to Congress
as a Republican in 1903. In 1909, he helped lead an “insurgency” that
limited the powers of House Speaker Joseph Cannon. He joined TR’s
Progressive Party in 1912, was reelected under that party’s banner, and
for two years headed its small contingent in the House. In that role, he
presented the party’s version of FTC legislation, and attended a meeting
where George Rublee and Louis Brandeis persuaded Wilson to embrace
administrative litigation for the FTC. After a failed Senate bid in 1914,
Murdock became the party’s national chair. In 1916, when TR aban-
doned the party, there was an effort to run Murdock for President. Mur-
dock declined and soon endorsed Wilson. Wilson nominated him to the
FTC for a short term in 1917 and a full term in 1918. Though Murdock
could not have declared himself a Democrat (three other Commission-
ers were Democrats), Huston Thompson pressed him in 1920 for that
party’s Vice Presidential spot.96
95 See http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/John_Garland_Pollard; John Stanley
Hopewell, An Outsider Looking In: John Garland Pollard and Machine Politics in Twenti-
eth Century Virginia (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia); Gov-
ernor-Elect’s Career Colorful, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1929, at 3; Ex-Gov. Pollard; Virginian Was 65,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1937, at 2; Ask Office for Virginian, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1926, at E7;
“Brought to the Pres. Attention by Sec. Roper, 5/15/34,” File 100, Box 8, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; John Garland Pollard Papers, File 177, Manuscript
Collection, College of William and Mary Library, Williamsburg, Va. (correspondence with
Bryan); id. at File 179 (efforts to return to the Commission in the 1920s).
96 See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, SUPP. 3: 1941–45, at 544 (1973); Victor Mur-
dock Dead; Wichita Editor, 74, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1945 (noting his groundbreaking work as
sports reporter); JAMES HOLT, CONGRESSIONAL INSURGENTS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM,
1909–1916, at 135–43 (1967) (1909 insurgency); Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at
60–62 (role in 1914 legislative debates); GEORGE MOWRY, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 359 (1947); Moose Elect Murdock, WASH. POST, June 11, 1916, at 1;
Victor Murdock Favors Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1916, at 8; Huston Thompson to Mur-
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Although Murdock had been a Progressive Party spokesman, like
many Progressives he may have been drawn more to TR as a transforma-
tive figure rather than to specific TR policies.97 In any event, as a Com-
missioner, he was skeptical about large firms and government price
regulation, both hallmarks of the New Nationalism.98 Though hailing
from a wheat-producing state, he was also skeptical about a key farm
bloc proposal that would have authorized an agency to buy surplus agri-
cultural products at high prices and dump them overseas for less.99 Com-
missioner Gaskill called him a “born, inherent, constitutional rebel,”100
and Murdock showed an independent streak at the FTC—sometimes
but not always advocating a more aggressive stance than his colleagues.
When he left in January 1924, Murdock returned to journalism. He ed-
ited the Wichita Daily Eagle (and resisted blandishments to return to
politics) until he died in 1945.101
C. HUSTON THOMPSON (1918–26)
Huston Thompson, whose actions in 1924 were already noted,102 grad-
uated from Princeton in 1897. While there or soon after, he developed a
relationship with Professor Woodrow Wilson. Huston played college
football, and then coached college ball (as a stern disciplinarian) for
several years before he became a lawyer in Colorado. He backed Wilson
when Wilson became embroiled in battles to make Princeton less aristo-
cratic.103 Although Thompson was then a Republican, Wilson made him
dock, July 7, 1920, Victor Murdock Papers, Box 69, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.; Victor Murdock Being Urged for Second Place on Democratic Ticket, BALT. SUN, June 18,
1920, at 3.
97 See generally SIDNEY MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009) (noting that the party was “leadership-
centered,” and its diverse membership of reformers had “different and sometimes con-
flicting reasons” for joining.). Id. at 9.
98 Gov’t Control of the Meat-Packing Indus., Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Com., 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 2361 (1918) (after “a great deal of hesitating mental
travel . . . I am back in the old camp of no trusts and competition”); High Cost of Living as
Affected by Trust and Monopolies, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22 (1919) [hereinafter High Cost of Living] (expressing concern about whether there
was “a legitimate economic limit to beneficial magnitude”); Stabilizing Prices of Farm Prod-
ucts, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1922).
99 Stabilizing Prices of Farm Products, supra note 98, at 95. The proposal came to be known
as “McNary-Haugen,” after two legislators who pressed the proposal.
100 Davis, supra note 62, at 215.
101 V. Murdock Dead; Wichita Editor, 74, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1945, at 11; William Ayres to
Victor Murdock (Mar. 18, 1924), Murdock Papers, supra note 96 (offer of support by
Congressman Ayres, a future Commissioner, for a Murdock Senate bid).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 73–76.
103 W. BARKSDALE MAYNARD, WOODROW WILSON, PRINCETON TO THE PRESIDENCY 221
(2008).
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Assistant Attorney General in charge of litigation before the Court of
Claims. Thompson sought a judgeship in 1917, but Wilson told him it
was the wrong career direction for him; Wilson also declined, that year,
to name Thompson to the Commission, explaining that the agency did
not need another lawyer. Thompson got his seat the next year.104
Thompson was now a Democrat, politically active and ambitious. His
1920 maneuvering on Murdock’s behalf was noted above. In 1923, Wil-
son urged the Governor of Colorado to name him to a Senate vacancy.
Thompson was mentioned as a possible running mate for La Follette in
1924 and a possible dark horse candidate for President in 1928. A press
report called him a “militant aggressive antimonopoly follower of the
Woodrow Wilson school.” Perhaps adding to his political luster, he was
active in the Boy Scouts and YMCA, and a presenter at Bible study.105
Thompson’s interests included “Blue Sky” cases involving deceit in
the sale of stocks (the SEC would not be created until 1934), and com-
mercial bribery, where manufacturers paid fees to a seller’s employees,
not necessarily with their employers’ knowledge. Thompson compared
this to tipping, which he deemed reprehensible. He was also interested
in international matters. He directed a study on European cooperatives
in 1923, seeking insights from foreign models to inform domestic policy,
and over several decades advocated an international commission to in-
vestigate trade disputes.106
104 Wilson to Samuel Huston Thompson, Aug. 1, 1912, 24 PWW (1978), supra note 17, at
579 (letter to Thompson’s father, noting long friendship with Huston); Huston Thompson,
Headed FTC Under Two Presidents, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1966, at B3; BOBBY HAWTHORNE,
LONGHORN FOOTBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 8 (2007) (noting Thompson’s 14–2 re-
cord, including an undefeated season, at University of Texas); Huston Thompson, The
Nineteen Hundred Champions, 2 THE ALCADE 349–52 (available on Google Books; describ-
ing how he imposed “physical chastisement” on a player who drank water at practice); id.
at 507 (letter from Attorney General T.W. Gregory); Thompson to Wilson, Sept. 17, 1920,
21 PWW (1976), supra note 17, at 132 (noting Republican affiliation); Thompson to Wil-
son (Jan. 15, 1917), 40 PWW (1982), supra note 17, at 490; Wilson to Thompson (Jan. 16,
1917), id. at 493; Wilson to Thompson, June 28, 1917, 43 PWW (1983), supra note 17, at
33 (lifetime appointment “would tend to . . . narrow your development”).
105 Wilson Brings Out a Senate Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1923, at 1; La Follette Group
Favors Democrat for Vice-President, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., July 5, 1924, at 1; Democrats Have 8
Dark Horses for Nomination, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1928, at 1; Wilson Helps Boy Scouts, WASH.
POST, July 7, 1918, at 13; Huston Thompson Again Heads “Y,” WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1919, at
22; Pulpit Addresses by Prominent Men, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1921, at 11.
106 Proposed Federal “Blue-Sky” Law, Hearing on H.R. 188 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
66th Cong, 1st Sess. 25–65 (1919); High Cost of Living, supra note 98, at 56–76 (supporting
a bill to require filings with the Treasury Department with the FTC retaining a role in
challenging misconduct); BOY’S LIFE, June 1922, at 54 (available on Google Books); De-
plores Business Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,1922, at 2 (tipping as “un-American”); Huston
Thompson, Reconstruction of International Good Will, 102 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 162 (1922). See also, e.g., World Held in Need of Trade Tribunal, WASH. POST, June 11,
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D. NELSON GASKILL (1920–25)
Nelson Gaskill also graduated from Princeton while Wilson taught
there, and went to Harvard Law School.107 He became an Assistant Attor-
ney General for New Jersey, where he consulted with Governor Wood-
row Wilson.108
Gaskill favored some expansive interpretations of the FTC’s powers,
including a potentially broad interpretation of Section 5.109 He was also
an ardent associationalist. Consistent with associational ends, he sought
authority for the FTC “to approve at least temporarily and protectively,
proposed conduct, to authorize agreements [in the first instance and
subject to judicial review].”110 He also argued that selling below cost was
a UMC, and an agreement not to do so should be legal.111 On other
matters, he advocated legalizing resale price maintenance, with the
moderately regulatory conditions that a fixed price be published and be
both a maximum and minimum.112 Gaskill anticipated some procedural
reforms that would later be associated with Humphrey. In February
1923, for example, he persuaded his colleagues to adopt a settlement
procedure in deception cases. The process was abandoned that Octo-
ber, when Thompson and Nugent joined Murdock in opposition.113
1931, at 5; discussion infra notes 238, 239, and accompanying text (discussing report on
foreign cooperation).
107 Gaskill to Wilson (June 26, 1907), 17 PWW (1974), supra note 17, at 230 (writing to
Wilson, then President of Princeton, to support Wilson’s challenge to “eating clubs”); Col.
Nelson Gaskill, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1964, at C7.
108 See Wilson to James Fairman Fielder, Mar. 30, 1913, 27 PWW (1978), supra note 17, at
240 (advising his successor as Governor to “consult with Gaskill” on a bill).
109 For example, he argued (though he did not use these precise terms) that the Sher-
man Act could not be used to challenge unilateral conduct by a firm whose market share
was under 45 percent, but Section 5 of the FTC Act might reach conduct by firms with
smaller market shares. Nelson Gaskill, The Quantity Rule in the Anti-trust Laws, Herbert
Hoover Papers, Dep’t of Commerce Papers, Box 199 (1924), Herbert Hoover Library,
West Branch, IA. He also took an aggressive view on the application of Section 5 to
merger challenges. See infra note 194.
110 Nelson Gaskill, Business and the Law (May 11, 1922), in NELSON B. GASKILL SPEECHES
1922–35, at 12 (unpublished collection) (on file in FTC Library) [hereinafter GASKILL
SPEECHES].
111 Nelson Gaskill, Some Aspects of Price Cutting (June 9, 1922), in GASKILL SPEECHES, supra
note 110, at 6; Cost Accounting, 27 FACTORY: THE MAGAZINE OF MGMT. 485 (Oct. 1921)
(available on Google Books).
112 Resale Price Fixing Advocated by Gaskill, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1923, at 12; Nelson Gaskill,
Address to the American Trade Association Executives (May 9, 1922), in GASKILL SPEECHES,
supra note 110, at 7.
113 7 FTC Min. 682–86 (Feb. 7, 1923) (approving process whereby the agency would not
issue a complaint if a target stipulated that it would abandon its practice); 8 FTC Min.
639–40 (Oct. 17, 1923) (dropping process). Thompson and Nugent said they approved
the process to relieve crowded dockets. Murdock missed the February 7 meeting, and
routinely dissented to actions taken under the process approved that day. E.g., 7 FTC Min.
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Gaskill’s interest in trade associations intersected those of Secretary
Hoover, and Gaskill responded to specific requests from associations,
routed through Hoover, with his views on the legality of various prac-
tices. He and Hoover corresponded, and Hoover suggested in 1924 “a
session with you and such people as are like minded in the administra-
tion, to see if we could not produce a real analysis and a proposition for
an entire revision of the restraint of trade laws.”114
While Gaskill’s interest in associations was hardly a pretext to curry
favor with Hoover—he later headed the Lead Pencil Institute—the
Hoover connection could doubtlessly have proved useful when he
sought reappointment. Gaskill did, indeed, call upon Hoover soon
before his term was to expire. Unfortunately for Gaskill, Hoover had less
influence on Coolidge than he would have had on Harding. Then, when
Gaskill sought the key endorsement of his home-state Senator Walter
Edge, Edge called him “a trifle too hard on business” and a “Wilson
Republican.” Gaskill received a recess appointment in 1924, but Coo-
lidge soon displaced him with Humphrey.115
E. JOHN NUGENT (1921–27)
John Nugent of Idaho had worked in mines when young and then
became a lawyer. Early in his career, he had joined with Clarence Dar-
row to defend union leader William Haywood against charges of mur-
dering the former state governor; Senator William Borah was a
prosecutor in the case. Nugent, described as a “Bryan Democrat,” was
appointed to a Senate vacancy in 1918. When he faced the voters in
1920, though, Nugent lost. Wilson, a lame duck President, then named
the lame duck Senator to the FTC. On Borah’s motion, the Republican-
255 (May 11, 1923). The Commission in those days would accept stipulated findings of
facts, but not stipulated orders.
114 David L. Wing to Herbert Hoover, Aug. 5, 1922, Hoover Papers, supra note 109,
Dep’t of Commerce Papers, Box 148 (1922), David L. Wing to Herbert Hoover, Feb. 8,
1924, Hoover Papers, supra, Dep’t of Commerce Papers, Box 199 (1924). Significantly,
Hoover wrote before Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), ex-
panded the scope of trade association information exchanges.
115 Gaskill to Hoover, Sept. 4, 1924 (enclosing correspondence with Senator Edge, and a
Gaskill dissent against the basing point pricing order), and Gaskill to Hoover, Dec. 4 and
6, 1924, Hoover Papers, supra note 109, Dep’t of Commerce Papers, Box 199; Edge to
Gaskill, Sept. 3, 1924, and Edge to C. Bascom Slemp, Sept. 3, 1924, Coolidge Papers, supra
note 75, File 100, Reel 68; No More Cabinet Changes in View Before March 4, WASH. POST, Jan.
14, 1925 (reporting recess appointment and noting uncertainty about longer-term ap-
pointment); NELSON B. GASKILL, PRICE CONTROL IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (1931) (noting
affiliation with the Lead Pencil Institute). Some of Gaskill’s behavior seems curious for
someone lobbying for reappointment, though; in particular, FTC minutes show that he
began a three-month vacation a month after Harding died. See 7 FTC Min. 521 (Sept. 5,
1923); 8 FTC Min. 64 (Dec. 4, 1923) (first meeting after his return).
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controlled Senate quickly confirmed him. This added to the Commis-
sion a Wilson appointee who would stay through 1927. While still a
Commissioner, he ran for his old Senate seat in 1926. Nugent died in
1931.116
F. VERNON VAN FLEET (1922–26)
Vernon Van Fleet had served for eight years on the Superior Court of
Indiana and was a special assistant to the Attorney General when he
became a Commissioner. He was a favorite of Senator James Watson of
Indiana, a harsh critic of the FTC and particularly its meatpackers inves-
tigation.117 Van Fleet’s arrival likely changed the outcome in some mat-
ters where he joined with Murdock and Gaskill. He dissented publicly
from FTC orders more than any other Commissioner during his first
years; for example, he dissented from a challenge to a merger of three
relatively small steel firms.118 But he also joined his colleagues in sup-
porting some controversial actions and reports, including a report on
the meatpackers, which he signed as Chairman, that reiterated variants
of the FTC’s earlier recommendations.119 He was also unavailable for
certain key votes—perhaps deliberately in at least one instance—al-
though the published reports give no indication that Van Fleet had not
supported the agency action.120
116 Boise Ready for the Haywood Trial . . . Military Is Reinforced, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1907, at 2;
Nugent Idaho Senator, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1918, at 1; Will Hold Up All Wilson’s Nominees,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1921, at 3 (noting that Nugent’s appointment was a matter of “Senato-
rial Courtesy”); Nugent on Trade Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1920, at 22; J.F. Nugent Dead;
Once Idaho Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1931, at 17; John Frost Nugent, http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=N000169.
117 THOMAS BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 80 (1932) (noting Van Fleet’s
relation with Watson); Charges Reds’ Nest in Federal Employ, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1919, at 1
(accusations by Watson); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 87, Nov. 30, 1924
(biography and announcement that Van Fleet had become Chairman).
118 For an example of a matter where Van Fleet joined with Murdock and Gaskill, see,
e.g., 7 FTC Min. 259–60 (May 14, 1923). For a discussion of the steel mergers, see infra
note 194 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., 6 FTC Min. 622 (Jan. 26, 1923) (Western Meat); 9 FTC Min. 38–39 (July 11,
1924) (U.S. Steel basing point pricing); PACKER CONSENT DECREE, S. DOC. NO. 219, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1925). The basing point pricing vote might have been influence by its
regional importance to the Midwest. These matters are discussed in detail in Part VI,
infra.
120 Thus, Van Fleet was absent for several votes leading to significant orders, which were
subsequently reversed, and are all discussed below. These included votes in two cases
charging price discrimination on the basis of trade status by National Biscuit Co. and
Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. 8 FTC Min. 111–12 (Dec. 21, 1923). The votes in the Kodak case,
also discussed below, are perhaps the most curious. Van Fleet and Gaskill both voted
against the original complaint. (Van Fleet had first moved, without getting a second, that
the Commission meet with the parties before issuing a complaint.) 6 FTC Min. 616 (Jan.
24, 1923). When the Commission later voted to issue a final order after trial, Van Fleet left
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Van Fleet did not have Thompson’s or Humphrey’s flair for publicity.
An incident from 1923 suggests a high degree of integrity. Though ap-
pointed by Harding, Van Fleet alone dissented from naming a staff
member to receive contributions to a Harding memorial fund, citing
“moral coercion” such appointment could make.121 He left in 1926,
before his term expired, and denied leaving because of tensions in the
Commission.122
G. CHARLES W. HUNT (1924–32)
At a time when farmers faced serious economic issues and formed an
important bloc in Congress, Charles Hunt had been a farmer and past
President of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. A graduate of the Iowa
State College, he had served briefly in the state legislature. His support-
ers included Herbert Hoover, with whom he had dealt during the war,
and Iowa Senator Albert Cummins, a leader of the fight to create the
FTC who had become president pro tem of the Senate.123
Hunt arrived in June 1924, with the election approaching in five
months and his term due to expire in fifteen. His arrival likely had some
impact on voting patterns (although Victor Murdock, who Hunt re-
placed, had his own idiosyncratic voting history). On matters where Van
Fleet and Gaskill aligned, Hunt never broke publicly with them, and a
common pattern of dissents was soon “Commissioners Nugent and
Thompson dissenting.”124 However, Hunt did not vote in lockstep with
Van Fleet and Gaskill. For example, he provided a key vote for a merger
challenge from which Van Fleet publicly dissented, with Gaskill missing
the vote;125 he aligned with Nugent and Thompson on a vote to include
during the discussion. 8 FTC Min. 439 (Apr. 2, 1924). Public documents of the time gave
no indication of these absences and dissents. See, e.g., Press Releases, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
supra note 87, Jan. 26, 1924 and Apr. 21, 1924.
121 8 FTC Min. 60 (Dec. 10, 1923).
122 Leaves Trade Commission, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1926, at E8.
123 C.W. Hunt, Ex-Member of Trade Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1938, at 19; ANNALS OF
IOWA (1939), at 480; Pension Plea Bill Heard by Coolidge, BALT. SUN, Apr. 24, 1924, at 2
(Cummins praising Hunt as “a real dirt farmer, experienced in business, and . . . in every
way well qualified for the place”); Cummins to Coolidge, Apr. 25, 1924, and Hoover to
Coolidge, May 2, 1924, Coolidge Papers, supra note 75, File 100BU, Reel 70.
124 For example, Commissioners Van Fleet, Gaskill, and Hunt prevailed on 3–2 votes to
dismiss several challenges to guarantees against price declines; immediately after, the
same Commissioners prevailed on a vote to modify the findings and order provisions in a
deception case against the Don-O-Lac company, so that both turned in part on standards
adopted by a trade association. 8 FTC Min. 259–62 (Oct. 10, 1924). For further discussion
of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 181–183 and notes 215–219.
125 See Fisk Rubber Co., 10 F.T.C. 433, 433 n.1 (1926) (dismissing complaint that had
been issued under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and reprinting in a footnote Van Fleet’s
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additional counts in a deception complaint.126 When he was renomi-
nated in 1926, a newspaper reported a charge “that he was supposed to
be ‘progressive’ in tendency when appointed, [but] exhibited reaction
in his votes and activities after assuming office.”127
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION: AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA,
JUDICIAL HOSTILITY, AND SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS
Turning to the FTC’s program, we examine first its administrative liti-
gation. The creation of an administrative adjudication process was a crit-
ical attribute of the new institution. Using administrative adjudication,
the Commission was intended to bring its distinctive analytical tools—
including the fusion of economics and law, recourse to information
gathering and study functions, and decisionmaking by a multi-member
board with diverse, complementary backgrounds—to bear on the exam-
ination of business conduct and the formulation of legal rules. Without
a substantial, effective administrative litigation program, the aim of mak-
ing the Commission an influential competition policy tribunal could not
be accomplished.
The new agency challenged a wide range of practices. Some of its
cases were championed by industry, through trade practice submittals or
through complaints (sometimes by predecessors to today’s Better Busi-
ness Bureaus) against individual firms.128 Some were championed by the
Senate, either by directly urging the FTC to issue a complaint or by call-
ing for a report that might lead to law enforcement. One case, discussed
below, was requested by President Coolidge. With these and other
promptings, the Commission brought an ambitious range of enforce-
ment actions. Further, while many of these were consistent with an array
of approaches, some markers suggest a particular affinity to elements of
the New Freedom.
The early Commission’s win-loss record, though, was disappointing.
Some of its problems, stemming from statutory limits, were not com-
plete surprises; indeed, Commissioners sought legislative fixes for many
earlier dissent to issuing the complaint); 9 FTC Min. 393, 395 (Nov. 29, 1924) (showing
Gaskill absent for the vote to issue the complaint).
126 9 FTC Min. 390–91 (Nov. 25, 1924) (including in a series of complaints involving
“Sheffield Silver” counts that went to misrepresentation as to place of origin as well as
misrepresentation as to quality).
127 Trade Board’s Policy Attacked in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1926, at 26. He was con-
firmed by a 48–20 vote. Senate Approves Hunt on Federal Trade Board, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar.
11, 1926, at 8.
128 See http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/coolhtml/coolenab.html (Associated Advertis-
ing Clubs of the World [a frequent complainant] was a predecessor to Better Business
Bureaus.).
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of them in 1919.129 Some initiatives, such as a monopolization challenge
to Western sugar interests, ran aground on courts’ narrow constructions
of “interstate commerce,” a problem we rarely note today.130 But its prin-
cipal obstacles stemmed from a combination of exogenous and internal
factors: a too-ambitious agenda, hostile courts, and frequently poor ar-
ticulation of its theories, rarely citing economic testimony and rarely ac-
companied (except when provoked by dissents) by legal citations.
Though some cases suggest that it would have had problems even had
it better explained its actions, the agency’s opacity doubtlessly under-
mined its litigation posture. Further, when Wilson proposed a Commis-
sion, he promised business “the advice, the definite guidance and
information which can be supplied by an administrative body . . . .131
Then as now, transparency was critical if the agency was to do its job.132
Here, the Commission’s performance was deficient. It not only failed to
explain adequately its adjudicative orders, but also (unlike trends in
FTC practice today) rarely explained decisions not to prosecute cases;
further, unless provoked by dissents, the Commission generally offered
at best a skeletal explanation when it dismissed a complaint after trial.133
However stretched its resources, that failure is particularly striking.
A. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
FTC challenges to vertical restraints produced most of its early en-
counters with the Supreme Court. These cases generally alleged viola-
tions of both Section 5 of the FTC Act (which it had exclusive authority
129 High Cost, supra note 98, at 25–26. Victor Murdock proposed a dozen changes. Antici-
pating the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act, for example, he sought authority to obtain civil penal-
ties for violations of FTC orders and to supplement the FTC’s authority over UMC with
separate authority over unfair acts. Anticipating the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act, he pro-
posed that Section 7 of the Clayton Act be amended to reach asset purchases as well as
stock acquisitions.
130 The FTC initially had jurisdiction over acts or practices “in commerce” (expanded in
1975 to “in or affecting commerce”). This limit, as well as the Constitutional Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST., Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3, often confounded early antitrust cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that manufacturing is not inter-
state commerce); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. FTC, 22 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1927).
131 H.R. DOC. NO. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1914).
132 See, e.g., Kovacic, FTC AT 100, supra note 7, at xxi.
133 See Cases in Which Orders of Discontinuance or Dismissal Have Been Entered, 2
F.T.C. 461–66 (1920–21) (including as explanations “Charge not sustained” and “No rea-
son assigned”). After Humphrey arrived, this began to change in cases where Nugent and
Thompson publicly explained their dissents from some dismissals, sometimes provoking
the majority to respond. E.g., Chicago Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n, 9 F.T.C. 517, 517–21
(1925) (Nugent and Thompson dissent to a dismissal); id. at 521–24 (response by
Humphrey, Hunt, and Van Fleet).
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to enforce), and Section 3 of the Clayton Act (which it enforced jointly
with the DOJ and private litigants).134
1. Exclusive Dealing and Tying Clauses
In its first case to reach the Supreme Court, the FTC’s order forbade a
tying arrangement.135 It had found that Gratz (as agent for another
firm) had 75 percent of a regional market for steel ties; that buyers were
“many times unable” to buy the ties elsewhere; and that Gratz used this
position to make buyers purchase bags as well as ties from it. The Com-
mission offered little conceptual analysis, and it confused matters by al-
leging both FTC and Clayton Act violations in the complaint, but—
without explanation—basing the order solely on the former.136 The dis-
appearance of the Clayton Act count makes it particularly glaring that
the decision offered no explanation of the criteria for applying Section
5, although its brief to the Supreme Court did articulate an efficiency-
based standard for UMC.137
In a decision issued while Wilson was still President, the Court reacted
with scorn.138 It ignored the FTC’s evidence of market share and its be-
lated explanation of UMC. The decision for seven Justices was written by
James McReynolds, who as Attorney General had opposed the creation
of a commission; a dissent for two Justices was written by Louis Brandeis,
who had pressed for the FTC’s establishment.139 The Court’s decision
turned on the fact that the pleadings did not allege market share, and it
evaluated the case solely by those pleadings; in this context (a tying ar-
rangement with no reference to market position), it declared that Sec-
tion 5 did not reach “practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to
good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or op-
pression, or against public policy because of their dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.”140
The agency did little better in its challenge to the exclusive dealing
practices of Curtis Publishing Company. The FTC issued an order under
the FTC and Clayton Acts, but ignored an issue raised at the trial: Were
134 Then as now, Section 3 proscribed such arrangements if their effect “may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”
135 Anderson Gratz & Benjamin Gratz, 1 F.T.C. 249, 255–57 (1918).
136 Id.
137 Brief for the Petitioner 45–52, FTC v. Gratz (Oct. Term 1919). The FTC still did not
explain why it dropped the Section 3 count.
138 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
139 For background on the Justices, see Winerman, Origins, supra note 13, at 53–55.
140 Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427.
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these arrangements contracts of sale or agency?141 Again, the agency
clarified its position in its brief to the Court; there it argued that they
were contracts of sale and thus violated Section 3, and, if contracts of
agency, they still violated Section 5 because of their effect on competi-
tion.142 The Court disagreed. Again writing for seven Justices, James Mc-
Reynolds said that the Clayton Act count failed because these were
contracts of agency; the Section 5 count collapsed because “[e]ffective
competition requires that traders have large freedom of action when
conducting their own affairs,” and could engage “competent agents obli-
gated to devote their time and attention to developing the principal’s
business, to the excluding of all others, where nothing else appears
. . . .”143 Again, Section 5 added nothing to other antitrust laws. Further,
the Court (with good reason) criticized the FTC’s meager findings, and
“in the interest of justice” chose not to follow the normal procedure, a
remand, where the agency had not considered key evidence.144 This trig-
gered a “doubting” opinion by Chief Justice Taft, joined by Brandeis,
that highlighted the need to “scrupulously comply with the evident in-
tention of congress that the Federal [Trade] Commission be made the
fact-finding body.”145
FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.146 stemmed from dozens of FTC challenges
to arrangements whereby oil companies provided inexpensive tanks and
pumps to retailers. The contracts with the refiners required that each
firm’s equipment be used to store and pump only that refiner’s brand of
gasoline. The complaints challenged the impact of these practices in
retail markets, though some also challenged its impact in markets for
tanks and pumps. As to the retail markets, some but not all of the deci-
sions found that some competing refiners did not, or could not afford
to, subsidize tanks and pumps for a network of retailers.147 The agency
tried each case individually, although its theory seemed to be based in
part on the aggregate effect of multiple retailers adopting these arrange-
ments. However, it apparently tired of writing multiple decisions. After
141 Brief for the Respondent 113–20, Curtis Publ’g Co., 2 F.T.C. 20 (1919). The brief is
available at National Archives, RG-122, Docket Section, Docketed Case Files, 1915–43,
Box No. 15.
142 Brief for the Petitioner 25–59, FTC v. Curtis Publ’g Co. (Oct. Term 1920).
143 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. FTC, 260 U.S. 568, 582 (1923).
144 Id. at 577 (extensive testimony yielded “a brief and rather vague report of two
pages . . .”), 580.
145 260 U.S. at 583. Taft had himself been no friend of the FTC in 1914. Winerman,
Origins, supra note 13, at 31.
146 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
147 Sinclair Ref. Co., 2 F.T.C. 127, 136–37 (1919); Maloney Oil & Mfg. Co., 2 F.T.C. 346
(1920).
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one, it appended a list of seventeen respondents and said that it “has
also issued similar orders in other cases involving substantially the same
facts . . . .”148
Multiple respondents challenged the orders, and four consolidated
cases reached the Court. Again, the Commission now explained itself
better. For some but not all of the respondents, it discussed indicia of
market power that it had not mentioned before.149 On the other hand, it
no longer made the point that some retailers were at a competitive dis-
advantage because they were unwilling or unable to invest in networks
of retailers. In a decision by Justice McReynolds, a now-unanimous
Court rejected the FTC’s findings. In addressing a Section 3 count, it
found that retailers retained substantial commercial freedom under the
arrangements and, in any event, could buy their own equipment for “a
comparatively small sum.”150 The Court then acknowledged Section 5’s
broader reach in a backhanded way, by considering the respondents’
justifications more broadly; it found that the arrangements protected
refiners’ interest in safety and that the public benefited from ease of
entry into the retail market.151
After these defeats, the Commission brought fewer Section 3 cases.152
Its case against the film industry, discussed below, would focus on “full
line forcing” before it was decided in 1927, but that was not the thrust of
the original agency complaint.153 On balance, the Commission’s pro-
gram on nonprice vertical restraints, like much of its program, was ambi-
tious but flawed.
148 Maloney Oil & Mfg. Co., 2 F.T.C. 246, 357 (1920). The list included such giants as
the Standard Oil Companies of Ohio, New Jersey, and New York.
149 Brief for the Petitioner 35–36, 40, FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co. (Oct. Term, 1922)
(noting, for example, that Standard Oil of New Jersey had the challenged arrangements
with about 42 percent of the dealers in its territory and “practically all the dealers in some
districts”).
150 FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 473–75 (1923).
151 Id. at 475–76.
152 A series of earlier cases in some ways similar to the tank and pump cases failed. B.S.
Pearsall Butter Co., 5 F.T.C. 127 (1922), rev’d, B.S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 F. 720
(7th Cir. 1923). Pearsall and scores of competitors developed exclusive dealing arrange-
ments. The FTC’s four-page decision did not explain why the practice violated the law
when there were so many consumer options on the market. The agency soon dismissed a
series of parallel cases. 6 F.T.C. 517 (1924) (listing seven cases). In contrast, Butterick Co., 6
F.T.C. 310 (1923), aff’d, 4 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925), was an (unsurprising) success. The
FTC’s detailed decision set forth, among other things, that respondent and its affiliates
had exclusive dealing contracts with nearly 40 percent of the distributors in the country.
However, this was a follow-on to an earlier case where the Supreme Court had previously
sustained a private Clayton Act suit. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co.,
258 U.S. 346 (1922).
153 See infra text accompanying note 185.
2010] OUTPOST YEARS FOR A START-UP AGENCY 181
2. Resale Price Maintenance
In 1919, the FTC proposed to legalize resale price maintenance
(RPM) under a highly regulatory framework.154 That approach went no-
where, and RPM prosecutions became a mainstay of its enforcement
program. During the four years covered by this study, the Commission
brought seventy-eight RPM cases (including cases where the impetus for
the RPM seemed to come from distributors’ cartels).155 These consti-
tuted 14 percent of the 549 cases during these years and nearly 35 per-
cent of the 223 cases that did not involve what would now be deemed
“consumer protection.”
The Commission’s 1919 decision in a challenge to Beech-Nut laid out
a theory: Beech-Nut’s RPM protected relatively inefficient distributors,
and distributors, themselves benefitting from higher prices, pressed
Beech-Nut’s competitors to adopt the practice.156 However, the agency
cited neither expert testimony nor case law to support this analysis. The
failure to discuss case law is particularly striking given the finding that
respondent’s conduct “does not constitute a contract or contracts
whereby resale prices are fixed, maintained, and enforced.”157 That find-
ing had particular salience in light of the timing of the agency decision.
Four weeks earlier, the Supreme Court had punched a hole in the per
se prohibition against RPM announced in Dr. Miles.158 In United States v.
Colgate & Co.,159 it held that a manufacturer would not violate the rule of
Dr. Miles if it unilaterally announced a policy of not dealing with dis-
counters and then terminated retailers that would not comply with its
terms.
As it had in cases dealing with nonprice vertical restraints, the FTC’s
briefing offered some further analysis. It argued in the alternative that
there was a tacit agreement in violation of the Sherman Act and that the
FTC Act would have forbidden Beech-Nut’s conduct even if there were
not.160 In its 1922 decision, the Court’s analysis was itself opaque.161 It
upheld the agency’s finding of liability, but changed its order by limiting
154 See supra text accompanying note 35.
155 For distributor cartel cases, see, e.g., The Am. Tobacco Co., 7 F.T.C. 546 (1924)
(dismissing complaint); 1923 ANNUAL REPORT 180–81, supra note 34 (fuller description of
the complaint and three other complaints, each naming as respondents a different to-
bacco company and the same trade association).
156 Beech-Nut Packing Co., 1 F.T.C. 516, 527–28 (1919).
157 Id. at 528.
158 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
159 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
160 Brief for the Petitioner at 25–48, FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. (Oct. Term 1921).
161 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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its proscriptions to “cooperative methods” between the respondents and
its distributors, customers, and agents. This was generally consistent with
Colgate’s analysis and suggests an intent to read Section 5 in conjunction
with the Sherman Act. The FTC’s victory was narrow, a 5–4 decision with
both McReynolds and Brandeis among the dissenters (Brandeis had
long advocated RPM.162) It was also a highly qualified win, as suggested
by the fact that, in the aftermath of its “victory,” the Commission (citing
the age of the cases) dismissed a slew of pending RPM cases.163
B. OTHER PRICING PRACTICES
The FTC’s efforts during these years to confront important problems
and grapple with difficult issues is shown in other pricing cases. We ex-
plore below FTC challenges during these years to two forms of price
discrimination and guarantees against price decline.164
1. Discrimination
The Commission brought its price discrimination cases under Section
5 and the original Section 2 of the Clayton Act. Section 2 prohibited,
subject to several provisos, discrimination in prices for commodities
whose effects “may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to cre-
ate a monopoly in any line of commerce.”165
a. Discrimination Based on Trade Status
Several FTC cases challenged discriminations based on trade status, a
practice that would later be called “secondary line discrimination.” One
case challenged The Mennen Co., which gave a preferred price to
wholesalers but refused to extend the preference to retailers who
162 See Louis Brandeis, On Maintaining Maker’s Prices (1913), reprinted in THE CURSE OF
BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).
163 1924 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 162–69. The Commission asserted that it
might reopen the cases if respondents engaged in conduct inconsistent with the Court’s
decision.
164 The Commission had earlier brought challenges to below-cost pricing. E.g., Ward
Baking Co., 1 F.T.C. 388 (1919), rev’d, Ward Baking Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 330 (2d Cir. 1920)
(order forbidding sale of bread on basis of buy one loaf, get one free; reversed for lack of
interstate commerce). However, it brought only one such case and issued no orders
against such pricing during the years discussed in this article. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 60–66 (1929 ed.)
[hereinafter NICB]; Balt. & Phila. S.S. Co., 6 F.T.C. 512 (1923) (dismissing the sole com-
plaint, Commissioner Gaskill dissenting). Additionally, during these years it brought two
cases, both dismissed, charging respondents with bidding up, to an excessive level, the
prices of raw materials. F.M. Stamper Co., 7 F.T.C. 546 (1924); Ohio Dairy Co., 8 F.T.C.
525 (1924).
165 Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Provisos allowed price differences based on
grade, quality or quantity, and for differences “in good faith to meet competition.”
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pooled their orders through cooperative societies. The FTC’s decision
noted that most of Mennen’s competitors did give their preferred prices
to such societies; it made limited findings about Mennen’s market posi-
tion; and it found that the effect of the practice “may be to substantially
lessen competition on the sale and distribution of respondent’s prod-
ucts, or between distributors thereof.”166
Similarly, in a pair of cases against the National Biscuit Co. and Loose-
Wiles Co., the respondents gave quantity discounts and allowed
branches of chain stores, but not individual retailers purchasing collec-
tively, to aggregate their orders for purposes of qualifying. In detailed
findings in these two cases, the Commission found that National Biscuit
had about a 50 percent national market share (and Loose-Wiles 15 per-
cent); that there were no cost savings in deliveries to branches of chain
stores; that the disadvantaged retailers lost customers for purposes of
other sales; and (unlike in Mennen) that other manufacturers followed
National Biscuit’s practices.167
Though the Commission seemed to touch all the bases to make a
credible showing of anticompetitive effects, the Second Circuit reversed
it in all three cases, with a key finding being that the Clayton Act did not
reach secondary line discrimination and (citing Colgate and other cases)
that the FTC’s order conflicted with Mennen’s right to set prices as it
chose.168 The FTC’s trial of these cases, and particularly the biscuit cases,
do not suffer the flaws of some early Commission cases. Indeed, though
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Mennen case, five years later
it declared in private litigation that the Second Circuit decisions were
wrong.169
b. Basing Point Pricing
The Commission’s 1921 challenge to “Pittsburgh Plus” pricing, also
known as basing point pricing, was one of its signature efforts of this
166 The Mennen Co., 4 F.T.C. 258, 276, 280–82 (1922), rev’d, The Mennen Co. v. FTC,
288 F. 774 (2d Cir. 1923). One of Mennen’s products was unique, and the firm’s aggre-
gate sales were $1.5 million, about $20 million in 2010 dollars. 4 F.T.C. at 282; http://ftp.
bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt [hereinafter Historical CPI data].
167 Nat’l Biscuit Co., 7 F.T.C. 206, 210–11 (market share), 214–15 (1924) and Loose-
Wiles Biscuit Co., 7 F.T.C. 218, 223 (1924), both rev’d sub. nom Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299
F. 733 (2d Cir. 1924). Van Fleet was absent from the meeting; Gaskill dissented, but chose
not to make his dissent public. 8 FTC Min. 187, 190 (Jan. 21, 1924).
168 The Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774, 778–81 (2d Cir. 1923).
169 George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. Am. Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 254 (1929) (Mennen
“was based on the premise that the statute was ambiguous and required the aid of com-
mittee reports, etc., to determine its meaning, a premise which we have rejected as
unsound.”).
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period—and the start of a battle that would extend for decades. U.S.
Steel produced 50 percent of the rolled steel in the country, approxi-
mately $1.5 billion annually or $20 billion in 2010 dollars. It had plants
in several cities, but, wherever steel was produced, U.S. Steel and its
competitors billed buyers for transportation as if it came from Pitts-
burgh (the largest production center). Steel manufacturers with plants
in or near Pittsburgh could thus price competitively in certain markets
where they otherwise might not have, while many customers outside
Pittsburgh paid more than they otherwise might have. The regional re-
sentment was reflected by the daily appearance, on the editorial page of
the Chicago Tribune over a series of years, of the demand, “Abolish Pitts-
burgh Plus,” and the 1924 order drew a banner headline across that
paper’s front page.170
The case had an extended pre-complaint history. The Commissioners
held six days of public hearings in 1919, before declining to issue a com-
plaint in 1920. Commissioners Gaskill, Murdock, and William Colver
were in the majority; Pollard and Thompson dissented; and (uniquely
for early FTC’s history) each Commissioner publicly explained his vote.
After further investigation and the replacement of Colver by John Nu-
gent, the agency reversed course in 1921, voting 3–2 to issue a com-
plaint. After an extended trial (with thirteen hours of oral argument),
the agency issued an order in 1924. That vote was 4–1. Nugent and
Thompson were now joined by Hunt and Van Fleet, whose Indiana and
Iowa ties perhaps influenced their votes. Gaskill alone opposed the
order.171
The Commission heard testimony from top economists—W. Z. Ripley
of Harvard, John R. Commons of the University of Wisconsin, and Frank
A. Fetter of Princeton. Two of them soon published on the subject. The
reason for the top-flight economic testimony was itself unusual, though:
the economists were funded by states that were adversely affected by the
practice.172
170 U.S. Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1, 19 (1924); Historical CPI data, supra note 166; 1 SIMON
N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 261
(1958); Pittsburgh Plus Outlawed, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 23, 1924, at 1.
171 3 FTC Min. 294 (July 1919), 501–06 (Dec. 3–6, 1919) (hearings); Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, supra note 87, July 24, 1920. 4 FTC Min. 372–74 (Nov. 16 and 17, 1920)
and 407–09 (Dec. 8–10, 1920) (reporting public hearings), 629 (Mar. 29, 1921) (report-
ing vote to issue complaint); United States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. at 1 (majority decision), 27
(reference to impact of the system on Indiana and Iowa), 61 (Gaskill dissent); 8 FTC Min.
694 (June 23, 1924) (noting oral argument). At no point did a Commissioner involved in
more than one action on the case substantially reverse an earlier position.
172 John R. Commons, The Delivered Price Practice in the Steel Market, 14 AM. ECON. REV. 505
(1924); Frank A. Fetter, The Economic Law of Market Areas, 38 Q.J. ECON. 520 (1924);
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The Commission’s complaint characterized the practice as “ex-
tort[ion].”173 Its order was based on findings that respondents had vio-
lated the prohibition on UMC under Section 5 of the FTC Act and the
prohibition on price discrimination under Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
There was a vertical component to the case—some of the Pittsburgh
manufacturers that benefited from the pricing practices of U.S. Steel’s
mills were U.S. Steel’s own subsidiaries—but much of the case was based
on the pricing practices independent of U.S. Steel’s downstream role. In
part, the Commission’s reasoning was that pricing based on the point of
manufacture (“free on board” or “f.o.b.” pricing) was the result ex-
pected by the “law of supply and demand.” Pittsburgh Plus pricing’s sur-
vival, according to the Commission, showed that supply and demand was
not determining prices, and this was possible because U.S. Steel’s com-
petitors’ followed its pricing lead. The “grotesque” practice of Pitts-
burgh Plus pricing, according to the FTC, made it easier for U.S. Steel’s
competitors to determine the precise price to charge in every locale.174
The general approach in the Commission’s decision—to seek an expla-
nation for a seemingly unexpected price pattern—in fact remained at
the core of subsequent debates about basing point pricing.175 Commis-
sioner Gaskill’s dissent, moreover, seemed to concede, at least for the
sake of argument, that the majority’s analysis might have had economic
merit. Gaskill argued that the FTC does not have a mandate to require
“the observance of sound economic principles,” and if the law allowed
unsound practices, the response had to come from the legislature.176
U.S. Steel did not contest the Commission’s order, but it apparently
flouted that order in part; it did not abolish all basing points, but rather
added additional points. One was in Chicago (although the basing point
price for Chicago was higher than that for Pittsburgh).177
The Supreme Court, though, soon cast doubt over the FTC ruling in a
case involving DOJ’s challenge to the Cement Institute.178 Justice Stone,
writing for six Justices, upheld basing point pricing in that industry. The
Postpones “Pittsburgh Plus” Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1923, at 6 (trial delayed when states
decided to develop economic testimony in mid-trial).
173 United States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. at 6.
174 Id. at 38–39, 48.
175 E.g., Dennis W. Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 26 J.L. & ECON. 51
(1983). Carlton argues that basing point pricing could be collusive under certain circum-
stances, but in other cases may be justified on the basis of efficiencies.
176 United States Steel Corp, 8 F.T.C. at 61–65.
177 WHITNEY, supra note 170, at 262–63; Frank Albert Fetter, Exit Basing Point Pricing, 38
AM. ECON. REV. 815 (1948) (characterizing the order as “mockingly accepted by the cor-
poration” and “negligently left unenforced”).
178 Cement Inst. Protective Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
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Court dismissed the basing point pricing challenge—part of a broad
challenge to facilitating practices—in two paragraphs. The market struc-
ture in cement was far different from the high concentration in the steel
industry, but the Court did not rely on specifics of the market structure
that might have made it more (or less) likely that the pricing structure
was collusive.179
The struggle over basing point pricing would renew within a decade.
During the era of the National Recovery Administration from 1933 to
1935, the N.R.A. embraced the practice and Franklin Roosevelt would
intervene as the Commission questioned the Steel Code before the Pres-
ident.180 After the N.R.A. era, the battle would resume in the courts.
There were many unusual elements to the Pittsburgh Plus case. In the
short term, the case appeared an undoubted success, perhaps the FTC’s
greatest success of the era. The Commission’s process also drew on the
agency’s strengths. It solicited public input before issuing a complaint. It
relied on sophisticated economic testimony for its time. Its decision was
a lengthy exposition (sixty-five pages, including the complaint and a
five-page dissent) and set forth a detailed analysis. It is true that high-
quality economists appeared only because affected states paid for their
testimony. Still, the case showed an unusually effective Commission,
and, if the experience was imperfect, it constitutes the FTC’s most signif-
icant antitrust success of the era.
2. Guarantee Against Price Decline
Another pricing practice that the FTC challenged in early complaints
was guarantees against declining prices, risk-shifting provisions by which
manufacturers agreed to absorb post-sale price drops. The Commission
brought several cases against the practice in 1918 and 1919, then solic-
ited views through thousands of questionnaires and initiated a trade
practice submittal procedure in 1920.181 The FTC never completed the
submittal. Starting in 1923 (when a change in views by Commissioner
Murdock made the difference) and continuing in 1925 (when two dis-
missals triggered written dissents by Commissioners Nugent and
Thompson), the agency dismissed the cases, several by 3–2 votes. Two of
179 Chief Justice Taft and Justices Sanford and McReynolds dissented. Fetter asserts that
an economic witness at the trial, who was not cross-examined, testified and cited to the
views of seventeen other economists, and that the Supreme Court was misled into con-
cluding that its analysis was supported by “[a] great volume of testimony . . . by distin-
guished economists.” Fetter, supra note 177, at 820.
180 HAWLEY, NEW DEAL, supra note 4, at 94–95.
181 NICB, supra note 164, at 112–16; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITTALS
27–33 (1920).
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these dismissals, shortly before and shortly after Humphrey arrived, in-
cluded dissenting statements by Nugent and Thompson; one was a four-
teen-page statement in a case where the party offering the guarantee was
alleged to be a dominant firm.182 This did not put the issue to rest,
though. Later in the decade, these practices would be questioned again
in trade practice conferences.183
C. ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR BY A MONOPOLIST: MADEIRA HILL
The FTC’s case against Madeira Hill was unusual in several respects.
The first was its source. President Coolidge, in office for barely a month,
requested the investigation on September 15, 1923, in response to a re-
port by the (short-lived) U.S. Coal Commission on coal prices during a
recent strike. That Commission had questioned why anthracite coal
passed through so many hands before reaching the consumer, asking if
this was a device to unduly raise prices. Second, the case was tried by the
full Commission, which sat for five consecutive days in December to
hear testimony, followed by argument on a motion to dismiss. Third, the
allegations were unusual. The FTC charged Madeira and several whole-
salers with a conspiracy (which seemed to benefit only Madeira). Alleg-
edly, Madeira had pledged to a state agency not to exceed a certain
price and circumvented that pledge by obtaining secret rebates through
its wholesalers. The complaint placed this in the context of a shortage
that gave “monopoly” power to Madeira and a handful of other firms.
On December 14, with Murdock dissenting and Thompson not partici-
pating, the Commission granted the motion to dismiss, announcing the
dismissal several weeks later with a press release saying that the facts
alleged had not been proven.184
182 Helvetia Milk Condensing Co., 6 F.T.C. 514 (1923); 6 FTC Min. 531–32 (Dec. 22,
1922) (initial vote in Helvetia to issue an order, with Van Fleet and Gaskill dissenting);
Globe Soap Co., 8 F.T.C. 535 (1925) (including a dissent by Thompson, joined by Nu-
gent, noting that some felt, among other things, that the practice tended to produce
overbuying and speculation by jobbers, and put “a premium on ignorance, inefficiency,
inexperience and incompetency to the detriment of the ultimate consumer”); Corn
Prods. Ref. Co., 9 F.T.C. 483 (1925) (including the extended statement by Nugent and
Thompson, arguing that the practice prevented consumers from reaping the benefits of
price drops).
183 The Commission still would not find that such guarantees violated Section 5, but it
would accept provisions in industry-submitted codes that condemned the practice as as-
pirational, but unenforceable, “expressions of the trade.” E.g., Millwork Industry Confer-
ence Rule 8 (1928), FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCES 141, 142 (1929).
184 7 FTC Min. 554 (Sept. 15, 1923), 8 FTC Min. 63–68 (Dec. 3 through 7, 1923), 8 FTC
Min. 84–85 (Dec. 14, 1923); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 87, Feb. 2,
1924. Gaskill wrote Coolidge that had the case not failed on the facts, the FTC might have
found a violation. Gaskill to Stephen P. Davis, Dep’t of Commerce (Jan. 30, 1924), enclos-
ing Gaskill to Coolidge (Jan. 24, 1924), Hoover Papers, supra note 109, Dep’t of Com-
merce Papers, Box 199.
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D. MONOPOLIZATION
1. Famous Players-Lasky
In August 1921, the Commission charged Famous Players-Lasky Cor-
poration with efforts, domestically and internationally, to monopolize
the film industry. The press release announcing the complaint asserted
that the respondent had become the largest concern in the motion pic-
ture industry and the biggest theater owner in the world, with opera-
tions in Europe, South America, Australia, India, China and Japan;
within the United States, two-thirds of the admissions to movies were for
theaters showing Paramount films. The original complaint pled viola-
tions of Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, but
the case would evolve as the long trial proceeded; allegations were not
borne out, and respondents’ market power eventually dropped. The
Commission’s eventual order would focus on “block booking,” respon-
dent’s efforts to require theaters that it did not own to purchase a full
block of its films to get the ones that they actually wanted. Respondents
did not appeal the order and, when the Commission sought enforce-
ment years later, its efforts failed. During the period under study here,
though, the Commission’s case was indicative of an aggressive law en-
forcement schedule, reaching into the “new economy” of the day.185
2. Eastman Kodak
The Commission’s ambitious monopolization program also included
a case against Eastman Kodak. The DOJ suggested the case to the FTC
in 1922 and, in a process that masked internal controversy, the FTC
brought it in April 1923 and decided it on a stipulated record a year
later.186 Kodak’s near monopoly of the film market had begun to erode
in the face of foreign competition. In response, Kodak acquired three
laboratories. When competing labs then agreed to buy only American
185 The case also had star power. Some hearings were held in California, and witnesses
included Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks. Press Release, Fed Trade Comm’n, supra
note 87, Aug. 31, 1921; Mary Pickford Tells of Sharp Competition; Big Producers Bottle Them Up,
Fairbanks Also Tells Trade Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1923, at 56 (Pickford and Fair-
banks were part owners of United Artists, which competed with respondents); Famous
Players-Lasky Corp., 11 F.T.C. 187 (1927), petition to enforce denied, 57 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1932). Under the FTC Act as originally passed, if a respondent did not initially seek judi-
cial review of an FTC order, the Commission could (as it did here) later institute a pro-
ceeding to “enforce” the order when the respondent violated it. The Commission could
seek, in that proceeding, a court order to enforce its own order. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
186 6 FTC Min. 271 (Aug. 8, 1922) (DOJ referred case as “peculiarly appropriate” for the
FTC); Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.T.C. 434 (1924). The internal disagreements (which were
not reflected on the public record of the proceeding) are discussed supra note 120.
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films, Kodak backed off its plan to operate the three labs, but retained
its interest in them. The FTC found that Kodak had thereby retained
and extended its monopoly, and, among other steps, ordered Kodak to
cease and desist from maintaining its ownership interest in those labs.
When the case reached the Supreme Court three years later, Justice Ed-
ward Sanford wrote for seven members, and Justice Stone wrote a dis-
sent that was joined by Justice Brandeis. The Court agreed with the
Commission on liability, but held, in a decision that undermined the
agency’s effectiveness, that Section 5 gave the FTC no authority to order
divestiture.187
3. The Radio Case (General Electric)
In February 1924, with Van Fleet absent, the Commission alleged one
conspiracy to monopolize the radio manufacturing industry through the
creation and use of a patent pool, and another to monopolize domestic
and transoceanic radio communications and broadcasting. Respondents
included the Radio Corporation of America and its owners (General
Electric Co., Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.); the United Fruit Company was also a re-
spondent because of its stations in Central and South America. The case
grew out of a report published two months before in response to a
House resolution.188 Attorney General Stone was apparently considering
a parallel DOJ case, but the DOJ did not bring one at this time.189 The
Commission eventually dismissed its complaint with a terse statement in
1928; several years later, the DOJ brought (and eventually settled) its
own case.190
4. Aluminum Company of America
As noted above, the FTC also developed a case against the Aluminum
Company of America during this period, publishing a report a month
before the 1924 election to urge the Justice Department to bring a con-
tempt case under a 1912 order—and Attorney General Stone was appar-
ently receptive to such a case before he moved to the Supreme Court.
The DOJ eventually declined to proceed (after the FTC refused to pro-
187 FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
188 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 87, Jan. 28, 1924; 8 FTC Min. 190
(Jan. 21, 1924).
189 Memorandum for the Secretary, June 10, 1925, RG 122, Docket Section, Auxiliary
Case Files, Box No. 562, File 1115-3-1, National Archives, College Park, Md. (reporting
the DOJ’s request about status of investigation); Stone Presages Action on Radio Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1924, at 26.
190 Gen. Elec. Co., 12 F.T.C. 510 (1928); ERIC P. WENAAS, RADIOLA, THE GOLDEN AGE OF
RCA, 1919–1939, at 388–90 (2007).
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vide documents that Stone requested), and the FTC would bring its own
case in 1925—which it would dismiss with a typically terse statement
in1930.191
E. MERGERS
The FTC pursued an aggressive merger program in its early years.
Insofar as these cases sought to limit market concentration, they were
markers of a New Freedom approach, despite Wilson’s early doubts
about divestiture orders.192 The FTC’s merger enforcement, though, la-
bored under severe challenges. Until 1976, there was no premerger re-
porting regime or effective mechanism for pre-consummation
challenges. Further, merger litigation during these years occurred in the
shadow of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the government’s challenge
to U.S. Steel, a monopolization case under the Sherman Act against a
firm that had grown through numerous consolidations.193
The FTC’s most high-profile challenges, with a rare premerger com-
ponent, grew out of subsequent mergers proposed by U.S. Steel’s com-
petitors. Seven firms initially proposed to merge, creating a firm
comparable in size to U.S. Steel. The Senate asked both the FTC and
DOJ to examine the matter. The planned consolidation soon broke into
two, one combining Bethlehem and Lackawanna Steel, the other a
three-party transaction centered around Midvale Steel. The transactions
still were not consummated when, in May 1923, the parties to the for-
mer agreed to await the review by the DOJ (but not the FTC). On June
6, the FTC challenged that transaction; two weeks later, the DOJ sug-
gested it had no problem with either. The FTC then challenged the
Midvale merger in late August. In a separate statement, Commissioner
Gaskill defended the use of Section 5 to challenge the merger. Dissent-
ing, Commissioner Van Fleet noted that the combined firm could have
a possible 7.5 percent market share when U.S. Steel already controlled
45 percent; he declared: “We strain at the gnat and swallow the camel.”
The Midvale challenge was a qualified “success.” Midvale abandoned the
deal a week later, explaining that the FTC’s case had undermined its
191 Aluminum Co. of Am., 13 F.T.C. 333 (1930). The Commission had initially denied
the request soon before Commissioner Humphrey replaced Gaskill. 9 FTC Min. 635–36
(Feb. 11, 1925) (Nugent and Thompson dissenting). These events would be explored in
Senate hearings. Aluminum Co. of Am., Hearings Before the S. Comm. of the Judiciary Pursuant
to S. Res. No. 109, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) [hereinafter Aluminum Hearings].
192 See supra text accompanying note 17.
193 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). For a discussion of the firm’s
last major acquisition in 1907 and its impact on the later litigation, see Marc Winerman,
Antitrust and the Crisis of ’07, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2008, http://www.abanet.org/anti
trust/at-source/08/12/Dec08-Winerman12-22f.pdf.
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financing. However, it soon joined the Bethlehem-Lackawanna transac-
tion, which the parties consummated. The Commission eventually sus-
pended its case in 1927, after its loss in Eastman Kodak, but waited twelve
more years to dismiss it.194
More generally, the FTC issued twenty-one such complaints before
March 4, 1921, and eighteen more during the next four years.195 Only
six of these led to agency orders, three of which reached the Court in a
consolidated case in 1926. The Justices all agreed to uphold one of
them, a challenge to an acquisition by the Western Meat Company of
another packer.196 But the Court rejected the other orders in a decision
by Justice McReynolds from which Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone and
Chief Justice Taft dissented.197 The quality of the market analysis had
surprisingly little impact on the results. The key issue was a statutory
limitation that (as it further developed in later cases) would make Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act useless until it was amended in 1950. Specifi-
cally, Section 7 then applied by its terms only to stock acquisitions. The
Western Meat order differed from the others in that the respondent con-
tinued to hold the acquired firm’s stock, and had not absorbed its assets,
before the FTC’s complaint issued.198
194 WHITNEY, supra note 170, at 265–66; Delay Steel Merger for Federal Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1922, at 30; Complaint of Steel Merger, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1922, at 1; Daugherty Finds
Lack of Anti-Merger Facts, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1922, at 2; Trade Commission Attacks Merger,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1922, at 6; Merger of 3 Steel Plants Is Dropped, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
1922, at 1; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 87, Aug. 31, 1922 (including
statements by Gaskill and Van Fleet). Victor Murdock urged in August that the Commis-
sion seek a preliminary injunction to block the merger. 6 FTC Min. 280 (Aug. 30, 1922).
Van Fleet also dissented when the Commission issued a new complaint challenging the
Bethlehem-Lackawanna-Midvale transaction. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra
note 87, Jan. 28, 1923.
195 These cases are summarized in a chart that lists all complaints that the FTC issued
under Clayton Act Section 7 through 1931. William Humphrey Papers, FTC File, Box 2
(1932–34), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
196 Western Meat Co., 5 F.T.C. 417 (1923).
197 One of these grew out of Swift’s acquisition of two other packers, where the agency
presented limited market share data and relied, in one market, on the possibility that
Swift might have entered another market. Swift & Co., 5 F.T.C. 143, 143, 166, 168 (1922)
(noting, for example, that respondent’s post-acquisition market share was more than one-
fifth of the cattle and hogs and one-third of the calves and sheep slaughtered under fed-
eral inspection). The other had challenged a series of acquisitions in the milk bottle in-
dustry by which respondent raised its market share from 40 to 70 percent, in a market
where (though the Court did not use the term) patents created an effective barrier to
entry. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 6 F.T.C. 213 (1923). Thatcher had the exclusive right to use
one of two best available technologies for making milk bottles; the four acquired firms
had exclusive rights to use the other available technologies.
198 FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). The decision was based solely on
Section 7, id. at 556, although one of the underlying orders had expressly premised divest-
iture on Section 5 as well. Swift & Co., 5 F.T.C. at 170.
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The Court thus rejected two of the FTC’s six merger orders. The
Commission itself subsequently reversed two others. And the other
two—including the Western Meat order that survived Supreme Court
scrutiny—proved useless. Western Meat, as had the Aluminum Com-
pany of America in an earlier case, effectively circumvented the orders
through transactions that survived court challenges.199 In essence, the
abandoned Midvale acquisition of 1922 was the closest the FTC came to
a victory in a merger case for over four decades.
F. HORIZONTAL CONSPIRACY
The Commission’s challenges to horizontal conspiracies were among
its most successful (if least innovative) efforts.200 Further, whatever the
merits of dual enforcement for these cases, the FTC itself seemed to
recognize the merits of DOJ enforcement in its repeated referrals of
conspiracy cases to the Department.201
One case that deserves particular mention involved information shar-
ing by United Typothetae, a printers’ trade association. The case went to
the heart of an issue that split the administration and also the Commis-
sion. As noted previously, the Commerce and Justice Departments were
at odds over the limits of such sharing, and, at the Commission, Nelson
Gaskill was a firm advocate of associationalism and open price associa-
tions.202 Huston Thompson, in contrast, was highly skeptical of such as-
sociations.203 The history of the case went back to one of the FTC’s
original Commissioners, Edward Hurley, a businessman and a strong ad-
vocate for uniform cost accounting procedures. Under his influence the
FTC published a widely distributed brochure about the procedures.
However, Hurley went further. In letters he signed as FTC Chairman
199 Western Meat, for example, insisted that it could not find a buyer. It then lent money
to the acquired firm (in part to enlarge the firm’s plant), sued on the loan, purchased the
assets at an execution sale, and then transferred the now-worthless stock. Noting that the
Commission did not challenge the good faith of Western Meat’s efforts at divestiture, the
court found no problem in these transactions. Western Meat Co. v. FTC, 33 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1929). See also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. FTC, 299 F. 361 (3d Cir. 1924).
200 NICB, supra note 164, at 213 (through 1929, agency had been upheld on every order
challenged).
201 Indeed, Commissioner Thompson’s testimony at Daugherty’s impeachment hearing
focused on the DOJ’s failure to follow through on FTC referrals. See id. at 212; supra
discussion at note 74 and accompanying text.
202 See supra discussions at notes 110, 114 and accompanying text.
203 Huston Thompson, Open Price Associations (undated speech), in THOMPSON, SPEECHES
1919–1940 (unpublished collection) (on file in FTC Library) (though many trade associa-
tions had “a fine spirit” and tried to address misconduct, as to open price associations, “I
have never found one that did not either fix prices or cause curtailment of production to
the point where it ultimately paralyzed the market.”).
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without consulting his colleagues, he wrote Typothetae and others ap-
proving specific plans for uniform cost accounting and information
sharing. Although the Commission disavowed Hurley’s letter to the re-
spondent before issuing its complaint, the respondent continued to rely
on it.204 Ultimately, Gaskill drafted the Commission’s unanimous order.
The findings of fact (which addressed practices of numerous local as-
sociations who were also named respondents) described numerous in-
stances where an association had suggested a specific price, and a typical
order provision forbade respondents from compiling average figures
“with instructions or suggestions for the translation of such standard
costs into selling prices.”205
G. “CONSUMER PROTECTION”
Under the original FTC Act, the FTC could challenge only unfair
methods of competition. It did not have separate authority to challenge
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” until 1938.206 However, the agency
used its UMC authority to challenge deception aimed at consumers, and
was early sustained in its efforts in a decision that Justice Brandeis wrote
for eight Justices, with only Justice McReynolds in dissent.207 While some
individual cases may have been trivial, the program as a whole was im-
portant because the remedies at common law for deception were inade-
quate.208 Over 60 percent of the FTC’s cases during these years (326 of
549) involved deception of consumers, including some cases involving
business purchasers. These included “blue sky” cases, in which the Com-
mission challenged deception in the sale of securities209; this work would
later be the province of the Securities and Exchange Commission, as the
FTC served as an incubator for a new agency. It included an occasional
case involving deception in export trade, brought under Section 4 of the
Webb-Pomerene Act.210 The FTC focused on print ads. “Direct advertis-
204 See Memorandum for the Chief Counsel, Nov. 28, 1921, National Archives RG-122,
Auxiliary case files, Box 190; see also Thomas Lane Moore, II, The Establishment of a “New
Freedom” Policy: The Federal Trade Commission, 1912–1918, at 109–14 (1980) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama).
205 United Typothetae of Am., 6 F.T.C. 345 (1923); 8 FTC Min. 400 (July 2, 1923) (not-
ing that order was prepared by Gaskill).
206 Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
207 FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
208 Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
209 E.g., Non-Derrick Drilling Mach. Co., 6 F.T.C. 43 (1923).
210 Caravel Co., 6 F.T.C. 198 (1923); 40 Stat. 516 (1918). See supra note 34 and accompa-
nying text.
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ing” as part of commercial sponsorship of radio developed only gradu-
ally, and at first very cautiously, during the early years of the decade.211
While most consumer protection cases involved deception, some did
not. A treatise by the National Industrial Conference Board listed decep-
tion cases as a species of “regulation of sales promotion practices.” Into
this broad category also fell cases challenging lotteries and numerous
challenges to commercial bribery.212 Many lottery cases turned on de-
ception, though in some cases the FTC (for decades) also challenged
the element of chance as itself immoral.213 Commercial bribery involved
payments to a buyer’s employees, sometimes but not always without the
employer’s knowledge.214
One series of cases, involving varnish manufacturers, touched in part
on the consumer protection activities of trade associations. The fullest
statement of the issue was set forth in The Don-O-Lac Co.215 The Commis-
sion found in1923 that the firm had sold as “shellac” a product with a
relatively small proportion of genuine shellac.216 A year later, it issued
revised findings that discussed standards set by a large trade association
in 1922 and a revised order that also incorporated specific standards,
although not quite the same standards.217 In an unusual twist, Commis-
sioners Thompson and Nugent (perhaps less enamored than their col-
leagues with the potential of industry self-regulation) both objected to
the more precise standard that the Commission adopted. Thompson,
moreover, made a further point that sounds quite modern. An industry
group had adopted a standard, “[b]ut, there is no testimony as to what
the ultimate consumer understand by the word ‘compound’” as used by
211 ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM 88–94 (1985). Marchand at-
tributes the slow embrace of “direct advertising” on radio to the medium’s “mystique of
gentility.” “Direct advertising” was product-specific advertising that went beyond, for ex-
ample, naming a musical group “the A & P Gypsies.” Id. at 93–94.
212 NICB, supra note 164, at x. The Commission brought thirty-three commercial bribery
cases during these years.
213 For example, in Budd Tailoring Co., 5 F.T.C. 207 (1922), the complaint challenged
(among other practices), a lottery system with no allegation of fraud, though the findings
of fact found fraud in the operation of the lottery, and that the goods were inferior. Id. at
217. The order went solely to misrepresentations. See also Bear Shoes Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d
96 (7th Cir. 1966) (upholding order barring lottery sales).
214 In 1926, the FTC modified prior orders to reach only payments without the knowl-
edge of the employer. Memorandum, 10 F.T.C. at 338–42 (July 19, 1926).
215 6 F.T.C. 283 (1923), modified, 8 F.T.C. 235 (1924).
216 The Don-O-Lac Co., 6 F.T.C. 283.
217 The Don-O-Lac Co., 8 F.T.C. 235, 239, 240, 242. Under the FTC order, if the term
“shellac” was used for a product for which shellac gum was not the “principal and pre-
dominant element,” it had to be qualified by the word “compound.” If the term was used
for a product with less shellac gum, it had to be qualified by the word “substitute.”
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the association and the FTC’s order.218 Thus, Thompson grappled with a
problem that remains under current Section 5, which now contains “un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices” as well as UMC authority: How to
address consumer confusion, using the FTC Act, by essentially setting
standards for terms for which consumers lack clear understanding.219
H. SUMMARY: THE FTC’S LITIGATION AGENDA
The Commission’s litigation program during these years was ambi-
tious. Unfortunately, the program was so ambitious that it often overex-
tended the agency. The Commission did face a hostile Supreme Court,
whose jurisprudence construing the FTC’s authority was often domi-
nated by Justice McReynolds, and likely would have had difficulties even
had it been more transparent; still, the Commission’s overextension
contributed as well to frequent flaws in its performance.
Substantively, the Commission’s litigation program suggests a New
Freedom bias. While many of its cases would have been equally compati-
ble with other approaches, its divestiture litigation and concerns with
information exchange addressed areas where the New Freedom (or at
least variants of the New Freedom) came in conflict with other
approaches.
VII. STUDIES
While an effective litigation program is an essential component of the
program for an effective competition agency, it does not stand alone.
For the FTC, studies have been, since the agency’s inception, another
critical element of the agency’s program. Indeed, its predecessor
agency, the Bureau of Corporations, focused entirely on studies. FTC
studies were generally done by the economic unit, though some were
under the chief counsel.220 Most responded to Senate resolutions; con-
sistent with the ties between the FTC and Senators from agricultural
states, the majority of these involved agriculture. An occasional study
was done at the behest of the House, the President, or the Attorney
General. Others were done at the Commission’s own initiative.221
218 Id. at 245.
219 Cf. 44 Fed. Reg. 50,218, 50,222–23 (1979) (failure to disclose R-Value for home insu-
lation as a deceptive and unfair act or practice); 16 C.F.R. 460 (“Labeling and Advertising
of Home Insulation”).
220 1923 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 14.
221 Sixteen Senate resolutions directed FTC studies these years, and the FTC submitted
reports responding to sixteen (not-quite-overlapping) resolutions. The House directed
only one study during these years, and two published studies responded to prior House
resolutions. President Coolidge directed a study of gasoline prices, which led to a non-
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Although there were exceptions, most FTC studies in the 1920s were
sectoral studies. They examined competitive conditions in one or more
industries, generally using accounting data and evidence of illegal agree-
ments. A few found no problems; most led to FTC litigation, referrals to
the DOJ, or legislative proposals. They were thus part of a broader Com-
mission program to address competitive problems.
A. THE MEATPACKING INVESTIGATION: A LEGACY OF CONTROVERSY
The most important early FTC study was its report on meatpackers.
The study, initiated at Wilson’s request, led to a preliminary report in
1918 and a six-volume report in 1919. The report found that five pack-
ers had collective market shares between 61 and 86 percent in various
lines of commerce and exercised collective control through “amazing
and devious ramifications.” Producers, competitors, and consumers
were “at [their] mercy,” because they controlled key components of dis-
tribution.222 The Commission proposed a government takeover of all re-
frigerator cars and all rolling stock used to transport meat; “the
principal and necessary” stockyards; and such branch houses, cold-stor-
age plants, and warehouses as needed for “competitive marketing and
storage of food products in the principal centers of distribution and
consumption.”223 The divestiture component might be seen as an ex-
pression of the New Freedom, but the highly regulatory approach was
reminiscent of the New Nationalism, particularly as described during
Victor Murdock’s remarks during the 1914 debates.224
The report led to Justice Department litigation that resulted in a pub-
lic confrontation between the FTC and the Department. The DOJ soon
sued the packers and reached a settlement to dissolve their interests in
the stockyards (but without government control). The FTC objected to
specific plans that packers later proposed, and the Department
presented the FTC’s objections to the packers’ first two proposals. Then,
in February 1921, the parties submitted a third plan, which the court
public report that he forwarded to the DOJ. The Attorney General did not request any
studies during these years, though the FTC submitted several reports responding to an
earlier request about lumber trade associations. Senate resolutions during these years led
to later studies of the national wealth (a report focused on taxation issues), bread, and
consolidation in electric power. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1929, at 229–33 [hereinafter
1929 ANNUAL REPORT]. For the Commission’s relation with Senate Progressives, see supra
notes 56, 57, 61, and accompanying text.
222 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE MEAT-PACK-
ING INDUSTRY, SUMMARY AND VOLUME 1 at 109–14 (1919).
223 Id. at 77.
224 See supra text accompanying note 15.
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immediately approved. The Commission learned about this through the
press, and asked the DOJ to request that the court vacate the approval.
Attorney General Mitchell Palmer refused, but said that the Commission
could send its own counsel. The Court ruled that the DOJ represented
the public in the matter (after the Department stated that it did not
object to the sale) and declined to hear the Commission.225
That August, Congress passed the Packers and Stockyards Act,226
which subjected the stockyards (still in private hands) to public utility
regulation. Responsibility for that regulation, as well as primary respon-
sibility for regulating UMC in the industry, was assigned to Henry Wal-
lace’s Department of Agriculture; for the first time, the FTC served as an
incubator for a program later moved elsewhere. The FTC, however, con-
tinued numerous cases, including the Swift and Armour cases discussed
above. The experience left a legacy of tensions, including tensions with
Senator James Watson of Indiana (Van Fleet’s reported patron).227
In a 1924 Report signed, surprisingly, by then-Chair Van Fleet, the
FTC declared that the 1921 consent order had failed to end the big
packers’ control of the stockyards and refrigerator cars. In connection
with a proceeding to modify the decree, the FTC argued for further
steps to separate the packers that ownership; for the cars to be placed
under control of a single firm; and for the cars as well as the stockyards
to be regulated as public utilities.228
B. AGRICULTURE
As noted above, many FTC reports that responded to Senate requests
involved agriculture. The FTC was generally asked to study low prices
for agricultural goods, high prices for agricultural inputs such as fertil-
izer, and perceived foreign threats to U.S. agricultural interests. As with
studies generally, some found limited or no problems, others found
competitive issues to address through litigation, and some led to recom-
mendations for legislation (or, in some cases, for actions that could be
225 1921 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 42–46.  See also Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, supra note 87, Sept. 17, 1920 (announcing FTC’s views).
226 Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 159 (1921).
227 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (Watson’s concerns during the meatpack-
ing investigation).
228 PACKER CONSENT DECREE, S. DOC. NO. 219, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925). The report
declined “without [further] study” to offer a definitive recommendation about whether
the covered packers should continue to be excluded from selling “unrelated lines” like
fruits and vegetables. Id. at 32. Commissioner Gaskill, in a separate statement noting the
need to protecting “competition” rather than “competitors,” argued that such a restric-
tion, if appropriate at all, should not apply solely to the packers who were under the
consent order. Id. at 35–36.
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taken by self-regulatory bodies).229 One set of studies looked at commod-
ities futures markets, addressing issues that would someday be done by
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.230
C. ENERGY: COAL AND OIL
Coal, like agriculture, was a depressed industry in the 1920s. In a self-
initiated 1922 report, the FTC recommended greater dissemination of
information about bituminous coal. This was similar to statistical work
that the FTC itself had earlier attempted (though the Commission had
encountered obstacles in its efforts to obtain information231) and that
Herbert Hoover’s Commerce Department encouraged and undertook
as well. According to the Commission, “means of Federal supervision
and publicity” could “avoid periods of excessively high prices and severe
depression.”232
The Commission was also asked repeatedly to study the oil industry
and sometimes did so on its own initiative. In a 1922 report, it urged
legislation to make antitrust decrees more effective. One problem with
the Standard Oil decree was that the firm’s previous owners received pro-
portional shares in its successor corporations; the FTC proposed legisla-
tion to abolish such common ownership.233 In 1921, it recommended
further development of foreign sources of production; developing tech-
nology to better conserve supplies, and a system of reporting to the gov-
ernment on market conditions, so the government could publicize the
information and make the market function more smoothly.234 In 1923, it
addressed foreign ownership of U.S. oil resources. That report de-
scribed the start of foreign ownership of U.S. resources (in part through
acquisitions of U.S. firms); discrimination against U.S. firms abroad; and
229 Thus, no problems were found in a 1921 report on commercial feeds and a 1925
report on the challenge to U.S. interests from Britain’s Empire Cotton Growing Corpora-
tion. See generally 1929 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 221, at 229, 231. In contrast, a 1922
report directed to the low price of leaf tobacco and high selling prices to consumers
focused on conspiracies between large firms and jobbers to enhance the selling price of
tobacco. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRICES OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS (1922).
230 E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN
TRADE, VOL. VI, PRICES OF GRAIN AND GRAIN FUTURES (1924).
231 See BLAISDELL, supra note 117, ch. 8.
232 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTMENT AND PROFIT IN SOFT-COAL MINING 12
(1922).
233 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PETROLEUM TRADE IN WYOMING AND MONTANA 4 (1922). See also
FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE PACIFIC COAST
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, PART II, at 132–33 (1921) (highlighting problems from continuing
parallel ownership).
234 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE PACIFIC
COAST PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, PART I, at 15 (1921).
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1920 legislation (the Mineral Leasing Act) that required reciprocity if
foreign interests were to continue to acquire U.S. assets. Though ac-
knowledging that it was unclear “how far the antitrust laws may be effec-
tive” to address such problems, the report concluded that domestic
resources were being rapidly depleted and highlighted that “a nation
having widely distributed supply and storage facilities and owning the
means of distribution will have certain advantages in world trade . . . .”235
D. HOME FURNISHINGS
The Commission’s study of the aluminum industry was perhaps its
most well-publicized report after the meatpacking study. As part of a
broader study of home furnishings industries, the FTC concluded that
the Aluminum Company of America was violating a 1912 consent order
and recommended that the DOJ sue for contempt. As noted above, this
recommendation, which directly challenged the interests of Treasury
Secretary Mellon, was announced a month before the 1924 election.
Nonetheless, Attorney General Stone was sufficiently interested to re-
quest the FTC’s investigative file—a request that the Commission felt
compelled to deny as to key documents (the target’s voluntary submis-
sions to the agency), even before Commissioner Humphrey arrived.236
The DOJ would decline to bring a case in the 1920s; the FTC would
bring (and ultimately dismiss) its own; and the Senate would hold hear-
ings in 1926 to scrutinize the earlier events.237
E. COOPERATIVES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
On its own initiative, the Commission reported on the cooperative
movement, focusing on, among others, agricultural and consumer coop-
eratives.238 Cooperatives were organizations through which farmers,
small business, or consumers joined together, among other purposes, to
buy and sell in the market, and were viewed as models to protect smaller
entities. Agricultural cooperatives were a component of the farm bloc’s
agenda, and the FTC also took steps to promote, or protect, various
235 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON FOREIGN OWN-
ERSHIP IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ix–x (1923).
236 9 FTC Min. 636 (Feb. 11, 1925) (Commissioners Thompson and Nugent dissenting).
237 See generally Aluminum Hearings, supra note 191.
238 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION COOPERATION IN FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES (1924) [hereinafter COOPERATION]. See also Co-operatives Aid in Reviving Europe, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MON., Aug. 28, 1923, at 4 (cooperatives as role models to protect small
businesses and consumers). An odd note is that the report treats post-Revolutionary Rus-
sia surprisingly lightly.
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types of cooperatives.239 This report is a detailed study of cooperatives in
Europe and elsewhere, a unique FTC document in that it reports exclu-
sively on foreign models as possible guides for domestic policy.
VIII. TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITTALS
The FTC in 1919 began its “trade practice submittal” process (later to
evolve into a “trade practice conference” process). This was a process by
which the full Commission or an individual Commissioner met repre-
sentatives of an industry (generally dozens or more). During these meet-
ings, the industries formulated rules that the Commission described in
its first conference as “a formally expressed judgment of the industry.”240
This was a significant and positive step for the agency, insofar as it
involved an element of outreach (albeit outreach limited to industry
representatives) in formulating policy. Further, the Commission inte-
grated these conferences with its litigation program. This was a two-way
street. The agency sought to encourage industry self-regulation, thus
leveraging its limited resources; it also used some conferences to iden-
tify UMC that it then pursued in litigation. In one unusual instance,
focusing on a problem, rather than a sector, it used a conference to
explore the merits of guarantees against price declines. In other in-
stances, industry sought a conference as an exercise in standard
setting.241
While the concept was sound, the implementation was sometimes
problematic. For example, the first submittal from 1919, covering the
creamery industry, forbade untrue statement about “the business poli-
cies or methods of a competitor” (it did not address other deception); it
forbade, as “against public policy,” the payment of certain commissions
in excess of three cents; and it proscribed, “as a tremendous waste,” the
furnishing of free cream cans to farmers.242 The program, however
much an advance, thus led to some problematic results in the early
1920s—and the problems would grow, later in the decade, when the
program dramatically expanded.
239 See, e.g., The Mennen Co. case discussion supra at text accompanying notes 166–167.
The FTC generally was not concerned about the potential competitive problems that joint
actions posed, although the 1924 report did note possible divergent interests between
consumer cooperatives that sought low prices and producer cooperatives that sought high
prices. FED. TRADE COMM’N, COOPERATION, supra note 238, at xiii–xiv.
240 E.g., Report of Meetings with Members of the Creamery Industry, Held at Omaha,
Nebraska on Oct. 3, 1929 and Nov. 3, 1919 [hereinafter Creamery Industry Report], in
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITTALS 1, 2–3 (1923).
241 Guarantee Against Price Declines (1920) and Sheffield Silver Plated Hollow-Ware
(1922), in TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITTALS, supra note 240, at 27–33, 40–44.
242 Creamery Industry Report, supra note 240, at 1, 4–6.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The core challenges for any competition agency are to set priorities
and execute them.243 These tasks can be complicated by external stake-
holders who pressure the agency or impose demands on it, as Congress
did frequently, and the White House infrequently, during the early
1920s. Further, the task of setting priorities is particularly complicated
where an agency is new and must sort among the goals, frequently dispa-
rate, of the legislators (and others) who created it. As discussed above,
the programs advanced in the debates from which the FTC emerged
included Wilson’s New Freedom, TR’s New Nationalism, and, to a lesser
extent, an associationalism advocated by (among others) Louis
Brandeis.
The challenge of setting and implementing priorities is further
heightened by political transitions. In the United States, this is most
stark when, as in 1921, the Presidency shifts from one party to another.
However, legislative shifts, and even cabinet shifts such as the arrival of a
new Attorney General, can have an impact on agency priorities.244 The
FTC faced all these pressures in the 1920s. It remained, in a real sense, a
start-up agency. The legislature and executive had both shifted from
Democratic to Republican control after the 1920 election. The political
scene was complicated by two incarnations of a “Progressive Party,” and
there were cross-currents in thinking about competition policy within
the main parties. Against this backdrop, the timing of vacancies left Wil-
son appointees to dominate the agency through 1924. Further, while
most Commission initiatives were compatible with more than one of the
visions that had initially animated the Commission, a number of initia-
tives suggest a particular bias toward a “New Freedom” program. In its
efforts, the Commission had an important constituency in Progressive
Senators from both major parties who could use (and be used by) the
agency, but not necessarily provide the funding and resources to meet
their various demands.
While the challenges that the FTC faced would have been daunting
for any agency, the Commission was in some ways poorly organized to
meet them. Its staff was small, making prioritization particularly impor-
tant. It lacked centralized leadership, making it particularly hard to im-
243 The most obvious way an agency can successfully execute a goal is to take action that
effectively stops the practice, such as issuing a cease-and-desist order. However, for an
adjudicative agency like the Commission, we suggest a somewhat broader definition of
“success.” An agency may succeed, for example, if it challenges a practice that raises com-
plex analytical issues and ultimately dismisses the complaint, but does so in a manner that
adds to the understanding of the merits of the practice and withstands the test of time.
244 See Kovacic, Oversight, supra note 5.
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pose, or encourage, such prioritization. Congress had allowed the
Commissioners to choose their own Chairman and given the Chairman
only limited authority beyond that shared by his fellow Commissioners.
The Commissioners’ process for implementing their discretion to
choose a Chair was to rotate the position annually, a procedure that
made it difficult for a strong manager to take the lead in trying to set
priorities.245 All collective business was done in meetings. While in-per-
son collective deliberations have an important function in a multi-mem-
ber agency,246 the Commission’s early processes tied up Commissioners
in excessive meetings, often dealing with routine matters. Further, no
Commissioners were professional economists and, during the Harding
and Coolidge years, all but Murdock and Hunt were lawyers. The law-
yers who generally dominated the agency, moreover, often failed to suf-
ficiently integrate the agency’s legal and economic functions.
Much to the early Commission’s credit, though, the agency did take
on tough issues, such as basing point pricing and price discrimination
based on trade status. It confronted competitive issues in the “new econ-
omy”‘ industries of its day. Beginning with multiple statutory tools, it
used its various authorities, and it supplemented its statutory tools with
an innovative trade practice submittal procedure that drew heavily on
public input. At its best, the agency integrated its investigatory and its
prosecutorial functions (as when it held extended public hearings on
basing point pricing before bringing a case) and economic and legal
reasoning (as when it almost accidentally received testimony from top-
flight economists during that case).
But, at least in part because it was stretched too thin by its inability to
set priorities, the FTC failed too often to execute its plans effectively.
The Commission faced a hostile judiciary and had an uphill battle to
implement a successful enforcement program. But it compounded its
problems by failing to explain adequately the rationales for many of its
early orders. It generally failed, as well, to explain decisions not to issue
orders after litigation, or not to prosecute in the first place. Its failure to
explain affirmative actions, at the least, contributed to its dismal record
245 Even William Humphrey, who would dominate the agency by the force of his person-
ality when he first arrived, would be publicly denouncing his colleagues, before Coolidge
left office, as “men clothed with a little brief authority” who “become drunk with their
own greatness.” Trade Board Report on Du Pont Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1929, at 19.
246 Indeed, the limits on nonpublic in-person deliberation imposed by the Government
in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, often constrain optimal agency functioning. See
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Presented by Stephen Calkins,
Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Before the Special Committee to Review the Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act, Administrative Conference of the United States (Sept. 12,
1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/suntest.shtm.
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before the Supreme Court. The FTC was intended to enforce the law, to
develop the law, and to clarify it for businesses. Its failure to explain
adequately both affirmative actions and decisions not to proceed were
fundamental shortcomings.
Broad grants of authority create broad political hazards, and the exer-
cise of expansive and open-ended mandates always permits opponents
to claim that the agency has overreached. This dictates care and caution
in delineating enforcement intentions and standards. In part because it
failed to prioritize, the agency confronted a severe mismatch between
capabilities and commitments, ultimately contributing to a failure to ex-
ecute. In this, it serves cautionary lessons for other new agencies.

